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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINGAPORE LAW: 
A BICENTENNIAL RETROSPECTIVE1
The present article reviews (in broad brushstrokes) the status 
of Singapore law during its bicentennial year. It is not only 
about origins but also about growth – in particular, the 
autochthonous or indigenous growth of the Singapore legal 
system (particularly since the independence of Singapore as 
a nation state on 9 August 1965). The analysis of this growth 
is divided into quantitative as well as qualitative parts. In 
particular, the former constitutes an empirical analysis which 
attempts – for the very first time − to tell the development 
of Singapore law through numbers, building on emerging 
techniques in data visualisation and empirical legal studies.
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I. Introduction
1 The present article, which reviews (in broad brushstrokes) the 
status of Singapore law during its bicentennial year since the founding 
of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819, is of particular significance 
as English law constitutes the foundation of Singapore law. The role of 
Raffles and his successors, therefore, could not have been more directly 
1 All views expressed in the present article are personal views only and do not reflect 
in any way the views of the Supreme Court of Singapore, the Singapore Management 
University or Lex Quanta. Although this article ought, ideally, to have been 
published last year, the immense amount of case law that had to be analysed has led 
to a slight delay. Perhaps this slight delay may be forgiven when viewed against the 
timeframe considered which stretches across two centuries. We thank Anmol Singh, 
Chua Hong Hui, Justin Hoo, Matthew Soo, and Teo Jim Yang for excellent research 
assistance.
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relevant.2 However, this article is not only about origins but also about 
growth – in particular, the autochthonous or indigenous growth of the 
Singapore legal system (particularly since the independence of Singapore 
as a nation state on 9  August 1965). Hence, it is equally significant 
that it brings together essentially three generations of legal scholars in 
interaction and collaboration with each other. This intergenerational 
encouragement and growth is emblematic of what is required if Singapore 
law is to continue to grow from strength to strength in the future as well. 
The first-named author, a former legal academic and presently a judge, 
represents the older generation from whom the legal baton must be 
passed in the near future. And so it is in the other generations that our 
future lies. In this regard, the second-named author is the youngest 
dean appointed to a local law school in recent times, whilst the third-
named author (the “baby” of the group) is a graduate in law as well as 
economics and is completely conversant with advanced methods of 
statistical analysis that are so necessary in a world that is now dominated 
by advances in technology (and the particular exercise of this skill will in 
fact be demonstrated in the illuminating statistical analyses below).
2 We naturally turn, first, to the distant past before proceeding to 
consider the present. Much has been written on the former3 and so we 
can be relatively brief. The main themes of the story sought to be captured 
here focus on the past five decades or so. This does not mean that the 
previous 150 years were unimportant – not in the least. However, the 
growth which we alluded to in the preceding paragraph begins around 
the time of Singapore’s independence. Up to that particular point in time, 
2 In his speech launching “The Singapore Bicentennial”, Prime Minister  Lee Hsien 
Loong referred to the broader lenses through which the bicentennial should be 
viewed (see Lee Hsien Loong, “Speech by PM Lee Hsien Loong at the launch of The 
Singapore Bicentennial on 28 January 2019” (28 January 2019) https://www.pmo.gov.
sg/Newsroom/PM-Lee-Hsien-Loong-at-the-launch-of-the-Singapore-Bicentennial-
Jan-2019 (accessed 29 January 2019)). As he succinctly observed:
1819 marked the beginning of a modern, outward-looking and multicultural 
Singapore. Without 1819, we may never have launched on the path to 
nationhood as we know it today. Without 1819, we would not have had 1965, 
and we would certainly not have celebrated the success of SG50. 1819 made 
these possible. … This was our journey, from Singapore to Singaporean.
 Significantly, though, he proceeded to observe thus:
This journey was not a straight and level path, forwards and upwards. Along 
the way there were many ups and downs, successes and failures, triumphs and 
tragedies. We fought for independence from our colonial masters. But we also 
recognise the decisive and indelible imprint that the British left on Singapore – 
the rule of law, our parliamentary system of government, even the language 
I am speaking today. [emphasis added]
3 See, eg, Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) as well as the literature cited 
therein.
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it is not surprising in the least that Singapore law was – apart from some 
variations in the statutory sphere – primarily English in form as well as 
substance. That is why the first-named author of this article was inspired 
to embark upon a doctoral thesis that sought to examine the development 
of Singapore law from an interdisciplinary perspective.4 From the past, 
we then consider (as just alluded to above) the development of Singapore 
law during the past five decades or so.5 In this last-mentioned regard, 
the analysis will be divided into quantitative as well as qualitative parts. 
We then conclude this article with some personal reflections. As the 
authors represent three generations of lawyers, each of us will contribute 
individually (albeit briefly) in this particular regard.
3 With this brief introduction, we now turn to consider – in brief 
compass – the development of Singapore law from 1819 to Singapore’s 
independence in 1965. However, before proceeding to consider briefly 
the past, five preliminary points might be usefully made.
II. Five preliminary points
4 The first is that Singapore did indeed have an historical past prior 
to its (colonial) founding by Raffles in 1819.6 However, for all intents and 
4 This was later published as Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of 
Singapore Law (Butterworths, 1990).
5 Whilst the development of Singapore law over the past five decades since 
independence has been dealt with comprehensively in a series of essays (see generally 
Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015), the present article adopts a slightly different statistical approach 
and not only selects (from a qualitative perspective) some of the more significant 
decisions (admittedly, itself a somewhat subjective process) but also significant 
decisions that were handed down after the aforementioned book was published.
6 See, eg, the recent (and excellent) collection of essays Studying Singapore Before 1800 
(Kwa Chong Guan & Peter Borschberg gen eds) (National University of Singapore 
Press, 2018) and (even more recently) the equally excellent book by Kwa Chong 
Guan et al, Seven Hundred Years – A History of Singapore (National Library Board 
and Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2019); reference may also be made to Tan Tai 
Yong, The Idea of Singapore: Smallness Unconstrained (World Scientific Publishing 
Co Pte Ltd, 2020). The classic work is C M Turnbull’s A History of Modern Singapore, 
1819–2005 (National University of Singapore Press, 2009). And in a recent speech 
by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to which reference has already been made, an 
excellent capsule summary of Singapore prior to its founding by Sir Thomas Stamford 
Raffles in 1819 was given as follows (see Lee Hsien Loong, “Speech by PM Lee Hsien 
Loong at the launch of The Singapore Bicentennial on 28 January 2019” (28 January 
2019) https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/PM-Lee-Hsien-Loong-at-the-launch-of-
the-Singapore-Bicentennial-Jan-2019 (accessed 29 January 2019)):
Stamford Raffles did not ‘discover’ Singapore, any more than Christopher 
Columbus ‘discovered’ America. By the time Raffles arrived in 1819, Singapore 
had already had hundreds of years of history. In the 14th century, this area, 
(cont’d on the next page)
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purposes, the prevailing method of dispute settlement was (as briefly 
noted below) quite different from that introduced by Great Britain in the 
form of English law. And this leads us to the next (and closely related) 
point.
5 The second is that whilst it might seem at least somewhat 
anomalous to talk about what is essentially the indigenous development 
of a foreign (in our case, English) law, the key lies in the fact that 
notwithstanding its foreign roots, English law has (as already alluded at 
the outset of the present article) in fact been developed indigenously. By 
way of a second related sub-point, it should be noted that there was no 
real uniform law (or lex loci) prior to the introduction of English law. 
A third related sub-point is this: whilst it is true that Singapore law as 
we know it today has its roots on a colonial law that was (at least at the 
very outset) “imposed” on it, that law (that is, the general principles of 
common law and equity) forms one branch of two dominant branches of 
law that operate in the world today (the other being the civil law system). 
This leads to a closely related (and fourth) sub-point, which is that the 
reception (and subsequent development) of English law in Singapore has 
in fact contributed positively to the facilitation of trade and commerce 
that constituted the lifeblood of the country from the outset and which 
(in modified and diversified forms) continue to contribute to Singapore’s 
prosperity today. Finally (and by way of a fifth sub-point), whilst the 
general principles of common law and equity literally arose from a 
so-called Western system, the sharp dichotomy that one might possibly 
seek to draw between so-called Western systems on the one hand and 
Eastern systems on the other misses, with respect, the fact that, regardless 
at the mouth of the Singapore River, was a thriving seaport called Temasek. 
Around this period, according to the Sejarah Melayu, Sang Nila Utama 
founded a kingdom here and named it Singapura. When the Europeans came 
to Southeast Asia in the 16th and 17th centuries, they knew about the island 
Singapore. Jacques de Coutre was a Flemish gem trader who knew the region 
well. Around 1630, two centuries before Stamford Raffles, de Coutre proposed 
to the King of Spain to build a fortress in Singapore, because of its strategic 
location. Had the King accepted de Coutre’s proposal, Singapore might have 
become a Spanish colony, instead of a British one. But he did not.
And it took another 200 years before Raffles landed at a spot near here, and 
persuaded the Sultan of Johor to allow the British East India Company to 
establish a trading post in Singapore. That was a crucial turning point in our 
history. It set this island on a trajectory leading to where we are today.
Raffles made Singapore a free port. The new colony prospered, and the 
population grew rapidly. … Immigrants came from Southeast Asia, China, 
India and beyond. … [T]hus we became a multicultural and open society. Trade 
was our life blood. It linked us to the archipelago around us, and to the world 
beyond. … We developed close economic and family ties with our neighbours 
in the region, and especially the Malay peninsula. We identified ourselves as 
Southeast Asian and especially Malayan.
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of the system of law that a particular country embraces, every system 
of law seeks to achieve just and fair results in the cases at hand and 
(as  importantly) must necessarily be universalisable as well as operate 
on (equally universal) principles of logic as well as common sense. Looked 
at in this light, the general principles of common law and equity which 
Singapore inherited (albeit initially at a colony of Great Britain) contain 
the qualities just mentioned in spades.
6 The third preliminary point is one that augurs very well for 
the Singapore legal system in general and its personnel in particular – 
a nuanced understanding as well as application and development of the 
law (including Singapore law) is relatively independent of the particular 
country’s (here Singapore’s) natural resources. Whilst it is true that funds 
need to be expended (especially in a common law system) on library 
resources, such expenditure is not as expensive compared to other 
disciplines within a typical university and this is an a fortiori case when 
compared to the general expenditure of any given country as a whole. As 
(if not more) importantly, excellence in the analysis, application as well 
as development of the law is, generally speaking, thereby not constrained 
by an absence of natural resources. The main limitations or constraints 
lie only to the extent to which lawyers, judges and legal academics limit 
their own minds and imaginations. Looked at in this light, there is no 
reason in logic or principle why Singapore cannot continue to develop its 
laws in order to better suit local conditions and circumstances – without, 
of course, losing sight of the fact that the indigenous or autochthonous 
development of Singapore law must not be undertaken for its own sake 
for to do that would be to merely indulge in “legal parochialism” without 
recognising the need to simultaneously balance such development 
with the broader (as well as inevitable and inexorable) influences of 
globalisation and internationalisation.7 Indeed, the world has – primarily 
through technology – become a much “smaller” world in every sense of 
the word. This has, in turn, required a corresponding global as well as 
international outlook. However (albeit at the risk of putting the point too 
simplistically), where the domestic needs and circumstances require it, 
Singapore law ought to be developed with these needs in mind.
7 The fourth preliminary point is that the focus of the present 
article is on the development of the general principles of the common law 
and equity in the Singapore context, although there will be brief references 
to local legislative developments as well.8
7 And see generally Andrew Phang, “Contract Law at Century’s End: Some Personal 
Reflections” (2000) 8 Asia Pac L Rev 1.
8 Reference may also be made to Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of 
Singapore Law (Butterworths, 1990) at chs  4 and 5 (which deals, inter alia, with 
(cont’d on the next page)
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8 The fifth preliminary point is a rather broader one – it eschews 
the most corrosive of views that views the law as being irretrievably 
subjective and therefore a mere instrument, so to speak, at arriving at 
a particular (and subjectively desired) decision. In refuting this extremely 
destructive perspective, we can do no better than quote extensively from 
a public lecture delivered by the first-named author:9
Although the topic of this lecture is ‘Doctrine and fairness in the law of contract’, 
the concepts of doctrine and fairness are not confined to the law of contract 
alone. On the contrary, they constitute, I suggest, the foundation of any practical 
and just legal system. That having been said, the law of contract is a particularly 
appropriate point of focus as well as analysis simply because it constitutes the 
foundation of (and is related to) virtually every area of commercial law.
Put simply, the central thesis of the present lecture is this: The rules and 
principles which constitute the doctrine of the law are not ends in themselves 
but are, rather, the means through which the courts arrive at substantively fair 
outcomes in the cases before them in every area of the law.
…
On the other hand, legal doctrine is not an end itself. Its primary function is 
to guide the court, in a reasoned fashion, to arrive at a fair result in the case 
before it. Here, too, academic literature has a potentially significant (perhaps 
even pivotal) role to play. This is because, in some quarters, there has − 
particularly with the advent of postmodern legal thought − been an increased 
(and, unfortunately, increasingly) sceptical view taken of the law in general and 
legal objectivity in particular. Such an approach is, on any view, both corrosive 
as well as destructive. Whilst one cannot deny that the application of objective 
rules and principles is a dynamic process which may therefore give rise (on 
occasion at least) to some unpredictability as well as uncertainty (particularly 
in an imperfect world), it is certainly the very antithesis of the law to argue that 
the law is wholly subjective and that (putting it crudely) ‘anything goes’.
Indeed, the view that the law is subjective (and, consequently, arbitrary) would 
cause an irreparable loss in the legitimacy of the law in the eyes of the public. 
And, as just mentioned, it would also dispirit as well as disempower lawyers, 
judges and students alike. And, from just a logical perspective, the very view 
that all law is subjective is itself an ‘absolute’ proposition that thus involves 
circularity and (more importantly) self-contradiction.
If I may interpose briefly (albeit informally and personally), when I hear the 
corrosive – and disorientating as well as dispiriting − sounds of scepticism and 
cynicism, I am reminded that, often, what is unseen is more important than 
what is seen. In particular, I am reminded of the values that are embodied in 
legislative developments in the context of the criminal law in the former chapter and 
in the context of family law and labour law as well as public housing in the latter 
chapter).
9 See Andrew Phang, “Doctrine and Fairness in the Law of Contract” (2009) 29 LS 534 
at 535−537.
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the law – in particular, the nobility of the quest for justice and the weighty 
responsibility we bear (whether as students, lawyers, academics or judges) to 
pursue this noble aim. These cannot be seen but nevertheless constitute the ideals 
that are the foundation of the enterprise of the law itself. I am also reminded 
that, on a deeper level, nobility and goodness in general is not something that 
we should take lightly. On the contrary, these are qualities which we should 
treasure. They are the true ‘anchors’ that will prevent us from being cast adrift 
in troubled (and troubling) times such as we are experiencing at the moment. 
I am reminded, here, of how a schoolmate of mine sacrificed himself in the 
prime of his life to rescue a person who was drowning. In that split second, he 
lost his life in saving another. In that split second, he accomplished more than 
I could ever do in a lifetime.
[emphasis in original]
9 Let us now turn to consider – in the briefest of terms – the 
development of Singapore law from 1819 till Singapore’s independence 
on 9 August 1965.
III. From the Second Charter of Justice to independence
A. “Legal chaos” and the Second Charter of Justice
(1) “Legal Chaos” – The Position Prior to the Introduction of the 
Second Charter of Justice10
10 The position prior to the introduction of the Second Charter of 
Justice was one of “legal chaos”. What this meant was that there were no 
instruments or documents of any kind governing the regulation of law 
and order in Singapore. There was, in other words, no uniform governing 
law applying to the then population of the island.11
11 The existing problems were exacerbated by the fact that there 
soon existed in Singapore itself a phenomenon which has in fact become 
a distinct characteristic even today – that of pluralism. There grew up, 
within Singapore itself, a conglomeration of different ethnic groups – 
both indigenous and (in the main) immigrant. Naturally, each ethnic 
group had a different worldview. Without a uniform governing law, 
10 For this part of the article, we draw from Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From 
Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 
2006) at pp 3–4.
11 See also Sir Walter Napier, Introduction to the Study of the Law Administered in the 
Colony of the Straits Settlements (Fraser  &  Neave, 1898), reprinted in convenient 
form in (1974) 16 Mal LR 4 at 13; and M B Hooker, “The East India Company and 
the Crown” (1969) 11 Mal LR 1 at 26.
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the little historical evidence that exists indicates that many of the tasks 
relating to the administration of justice were in fact left to headmen or 
leaders of the respective ethnic groups – a system commonly referred to 
as “indirect rule”.12
12 Sir  Thomas Stamford Raffles did in fact attempt to formulate 
some regulations. Unfortunately, however, the legality of these regulations 
is dubious.13
13 The law is not – and cannot be – divorced from the practical 
reality which it is supposed to regulate. Given the absence of a uniform 
law (and, hence, a situation of “legal chaos”), it would appear that there 
was, simultaneously, a situation of actual or factual chaos as well.14 This 
was due, in large part, to the disorder and chaos caused by the Chinese 
secret societies,15 which continued in fact to be a virtually insoluble 
problem in so far as the colonial administrators were concerned. It might 
be added that the relatively undeveloped infrastructure of the island of 
Singapore merely exacerbated the problems of law and order.16
14 In short, the Second Charter was a much-needed document 
as it would authorise both the setting-up of the legal infrastructure 
(in the form, principally, of the courts as well as allied procedure) as well 
as introduce the substantive law to be applied. In essence, the Second 
Charter would provide both the form as well as the substance required 
12 See “Raffles’ Singapore Regulations – 1823”, published in accessible form in (1968) 
10 Mal LR 248. See also Chan Gaik Gnoh, “The Kapitan Cina System in the Straits 
Settlements” (1982) 25 Malaya in History 74 at 79, where the learned author states 
that in so far as Malacca was concerned, the British continued to recognise the 
Dutch-appointed kapitans (viz, headmen or leaders). See also Wong Choon San, 
A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans (Ministry of Culture, Singapore, 1963) at p i, where it 
is observed:
A Kapitan, as conceived by the Chinese, is the recognised captain, chief or 
headman of a community on foreign soil, particularly the Kapitan officially 
vested with certain executive, administrative and, in some cases, judicial 
powers over his own people, and invariably acting as the channel between the 
Government and the community.
13 See “Raffles’ Singapore Regulations – 1823” (1968) 10  Mal LR 248 at 249; Elissa 
Nassim, The Administration of Justice in the Straits Settlements, 1819–1855 
(unpublished academic exercise, University of Malaya in Singapore History 
Department, 1959) at pp  7, 12 and 14; as well as “Notices of Singapore” (1854) 
8 Journal of the Indian Archipelago and East Asia at 330–334.
14 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law (Butterworths, 
Singapore, 1990), especially at p 35.
15 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law (Butterworths, 
Singapore, 1990), especially at ch 4, Pt III (and the works cited therein).
16 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law (Butterworths, 
Singapore, 1990) at p 35.
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not only for the introduction of law and order into Singapore but also for 
the very establishment of a proper legal system itself.
(2) The Introduction of the Second Charter of Justice17
15 The Second Charter of Justice was granted by the Crown and 
was dated 27  November 1826. There is not much known by way of 
detail. This is not surprising in view of the time and context concerned. 
In all likelihood, the Second Charter arrived without much fanfare. 
This does not, of course, detract in any way from its vital importance as 
a  foundational legal document of the first order. What we do know is, 
in the words of J W Norton Kyshe, that “[t]he 2nd Charter only reached 
Penang in August, 1827, although Sir John Thomas Claridge, the first 
Recorder under it, had arrived in July, 1826”.18 The reason why the Second 
Charter was sent to Penang and not Singapore was, presumably, because 
the former was founded first and constituted the principal “headquarters”, 
so to speak, of the then Straits Settlements. Kyshe also notes that “[o]n the 
receipt of the Charter, the usual formalities were gone into of proclaiming 
the Charter, making Rules and Orders of Court, – Court hours being fixed 
from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., setting Tables of Fees, and other matters connected 
with the working of the Court”.19 The Proclamation of the Charter took 
place on 9  August 1827. This date might be noted, particularly in the 
light of the fact that this was the same date that Singapore achieved full 
independence – albeit some 138  years later. However, the events that 
followed the grant of the Second Charter were not particularly auspicious 
as disputes occurred between the Recorder and the other judges; indeed, 
Sir Thomas Claridge was ultimately recalled from the office of Recorder.20 
One charge, in fact, comprising the third in a series of six charges, was 
“his refusal to proceed [from Penang] to Singapore and Malacca for the 
purpose of holding Sessions for the trial of criminals at those Settlements, 
17 For this part of the article, we draw from Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From 
Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 
2006) at pp 4–9.
18 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 96 (this work is, in fact, an accessible reprint of the author’s 
seminal (and justly famous) introductions to volumes  1 and 4 of his (equally 
seminal and famous) series of law reports entitled Cases Heard and Determined in 
Her Majesty’s Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements, 1808–1890 (better known as 
Kyshe’s Law Reports (Singapore and Straits Printing Office, Singapore, 1885–1890)). 
There are also valuable and informative appendices to this reprint which were not 
present in the original work.
19 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 96.
20 See generally J  W  Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 
1786–1890” (1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 97–102.
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unless the Government would pay the circuit expenses”.21 In the wake of 
this refusal, we are told that “Mr.  Fullerton [Mr  Robert Fullerton, the 
Governor of the Straits Settlements] proceeded to the former Settlement, 
and there on 22nd May, 1828, with Mr.  Kenneth Murchison, Resident 
Councillor, held the first Court or Session of Oyer and Terminer, since 
the Proclamation of the Charter, and consequently the first Court of the 
kind ever assembled in Singapore”.22 Kyshe provides a further elaboration 
of this sitting thus:23
At this first Session, 27 Indictments were presented to the Grand-Jury,[24] of 
which 6 were found for murder, 2 being against the same individual, 1 for 
manslaughter and the rest for cases of assault and offences against property. 
In two of the murder cases, the culprits were sentenced to death and executed: 
the first (and therefore the first since the establishment of the Court), on the 
2nd  June, 1828. On the occasion of passing sentence of death on the first 
prisoner the Court informed him that this ‘being the first time a Court of Oyer 
and Terminer had been held in Singapore, the Court would willingly have 
mitigated the sentence had there been any extenuating circumstances, but that 
they could see none.’ At this Session, the Governor in his charge to the Grand-
Jury, told them that ‘two persons accused of piracy must now be discharged 
for want of Admiralty jurisdiction, a defect already noticed, and which it was 
expected would in due course be amended.’
16 Given the state of disorder the island had hitherto been in, it is not 
surprising, perhaps, that the focus was on law and order in general, and 
the administration of criminal justice in particular. We are further told 
that “[f]rom Singapore, Mr. Fullerton proceeded to Malacca, where he 
opened the Assizes for the first time in that Settlement on the 16th June, 
1828, and after disposing of the Criminal business there, returned to 
Penang”.25
17 Interestingly, though, Sir John Claridge did, prior to his recall, 
resume his duties as Recorder on 22  December 1828 after leaving for 
Calcutta on 13 October 1828 “for the purpose of laying before the Judges 
of the Supreme Court, a full and true statement of all that had passed 
between the Government in Council … and himself, and of having an 
21 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 98. See also at 99.
22 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 99.
23 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 99.
24 See generally Y  K  Lee, “The Grand Jury in Early Singapore (1819–1873)” (1973) 
46 Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 55.
25 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 99.
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interview with the Governor-General [of India]”.26 He did then proceed 
on circuit and finally arrived in Singapore on 28 January 182927 – well 
over a year after the Second Charter had arrived in the Straits Settlements 
and well over two years after his own arrival at the same. He ultimately 
left Singapore on 9  September 1829, and departed from Calcutta for 
England on 4 July 1830.28 However, although Sir John Claridge was found 
to have “proceeded from a mistaken view of the line of his duty, and not 
from any corrupt or improper motive”,29 he could not be recommended 
to continue in his office as Recorder – and was duly removed from the 
office accordingly.30 There followed some confusion as to the status of the 
Court of Judicature after the Straits Settlements ceased to be a separate 
Presidency and was made subordinate to the Government of Fort William 
in Bengal,31 but that particular episode need not detain us. Suffice it to 
state that after the initial “hiccups”, the Court of Judicature proceeded 
with its work as originally intended.
18 Returning to the structure of the Second Charter proper, the 
Charter itself created the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales’ Island, 
Singapore and Malacca. The court itself was to consist of the Governor, 
the Resident Counsellors as well as a Recorder as judges, with the 
Recorder taking precedence next to the Governor. Indeed, the Charter 
itself was quite comprehensive: It provided for what was essential for the 
smooth functioning of the court, including, inter alia, the appointment 
of a Registrar and a Sheriff, as well as Coroners, and provision for the 
appearance of counsel. Foremost, however, was the “Justice and Right” 
clause. The answer to the question as to whether or not English law – 
or some other law – was introduced into Singapore hinged on the 
interpretation of this particular clause. And it is to this fundamental issue 
that our attention must now turn.
19 The received wisdom – as stated at the outset of this work – 
is that the Second Charter introduced English law into Singapore. Unlike 
26 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 100.
27 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 100.
28 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 101.
29 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 101.
30 See J  W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–1890” 
(1969) 11 Mal LR 38 at 101–102.
31 See generally J W Norton Kyshe, “A Judicial History of the Straits Settlements 1786–
1890” (1969) 11 Mal LR 38 102–106.
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analogous statutes elsewhere,32 the Second Charter is (owing to its 
vintage) couched in archaic language. In this regard, the material part of 
the Second Charter itself reads as follows:
And We do further give to the said Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales’ 
Island, Singapore and Malacca, full Power and Authority, upon examining 
and considering the several Allegations and Proofs of the said Parties to such 
Suit, or to such of them as shall appear at the Trial or Hearing thereof, or of 
the Complainant or Complainants, or Parties promoting such Suit alone, in 
case the Defendant or Defendants shall make Default after Appearance, or 
say nothing, or confess the Petition of Complaint or ex parte the Petitioner, if 
Justice shall so require, and on examining and considering the Depositions of 
the Witnesses, to give and pass Judgment and Sentence according to Justice and 
Right: And in any case of any Proceeding removed from or originating in any 
inferior Court of Judicature, to remit the same thereto, as substantial Justice 
shall best be attainable; and also to award and order such Costs to be paid by 
either or any of the Parties to the other or others, as the said Court shall think 
just. [emphasis added]
20 The principal issue – and one that, as we shall see, led to some 
controversy more than 150 years later in the academic literature – centres 
on the construction of what has popularly been known as the “Justice 
and Right” clause (which was emphasised in the extract just set out). 
Put simply, the Second Charter, as it was originally phrased, did not 
state expressly that English law was received into the Straits Settlements 
(including Singapore). What it did state, as seen from the extract just 
quoted, was that the local courts were “to give and pass Judgment and 
Sentence according to Justice and Right” [emphasis added].
21 The key decision in this regard is that of Sir  Peter Benson 
Maxwell R in R v Willans.33 In this case, Maxwell R held that the words 
32 Which constituted locally enacted legislation: see, eg, the Declaratory Act (1965) 
vol 1, Cap 2 (The Statute Law of the Bahama Islands 1799–1965); Law of England 
(Application) Act (1966) vol  5, Cap  104 (The Laws of Gambia); the Hong Kong 
Application of English Law Ordinance (Cap  88, 1971 Rev Ed); Law of England 
(Application) Law (1959) vol 3, Cap 60 (Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria); s 3 
of the Malaysian Civil Law Act 1956 (Revised – 1972); and the Application of Laws 
Enactment (1951) vol 1, Cap 2 (Laws of Brunei). Most of these statutes are probably 
now of largely historical interest. It should also be noted that an express provision per 
se does not guarantee that problems of construction will be obviated: see, eg, in the 
Malaysian context, G W Bartholomew, The Commercial Law of Malaysia – A Study 
in the Reception of English Law (Malayan Law Journal Ltd, 1965) and Joseph Chia, 
“Reception of English Law under Sections 3 and 5 of the Civil Law Act (Revised 
1972)” [1974] Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law 42. For similar problems 
in the Papua New Guinea context, see R S O’Regan, “The Common Law and English 
Statutes in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea” (1971) 45 Australian LJ 297.
33 (1858) 3 Ky 16. See also In the Goods of Abdullah (1835) 2 Ky Ecc 8 and Fatimah v 
D Logan (1871) 1 Ky 255, which are the other leading cases.
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“Justice and Right” derive from the selfsame language in chapter 40 of 
the Magna Carta.34 This view might itself be historically inaccurate, for as 
William Sharp McKechnie pointed out, in Magna Carta – A Commentary 
on the Great Charter of King John,35 chapter 40 of the Magna Carta centred 
on the cost of justice and was intended to redress abuses of the system 
with regard to illegitimate or exorbitant payments exacted by the Crown. 
However, that having been said, the learned author does acknowledge, as 
follows:36
It is not to such considerations, however, that this chapter owes the prominence 
usually given to it in legal treatises; but rather to the fact that it has been 
interpreted as a universal guarantee of impartial justice to high and low; and 
because, when so interpreted, it has become in the hands of patriots in many 
ages a powerful weapon of the cause of constitutional freedom.
The reference here is probably to Sir Edward Coke.37 In the final analysis, 
it may well be that the draftsman of the Second Charter in fact had this 
noble – albeit historically inaccurate – concept of “Justice and Right” in 
mind, especially in view of the fact that it was issued (in form at least) by 
royal decree.
(3) The debate
22 The historical provenance of the “Justice and Right” clause 
notwithstanding, the key issue that arose in R v Willans and for us today 
is the meaning to be attributed to that particular clause. Did it introduce 
English law into Singapore, or did it introduce the laws and customs 
of the then local population? This, in turn, raises a myriad of other 
questions. For example, what was the state of the legal system, if any, at 
the time of the introduction of the Second Charter (a question we have 
in fact already addressed above)?38 And would this give us a clue as to 
the meaning to be attributed to the “Justice and Right” clause? What, on 
an even broader level of inquiry, was the intention of the draftsman of 
the Second Charter? What is clear is that for over a century and a half, 
the interpretation adopted by Maxwell  R in R v Willans was accepted 
without question. In other words, the courts and, indeed, the country as 
a whole, proceeded on the fundamental assumption that English law had 
34 This view has found support in the Australian decision of MacDonald v Levy (1833) 
1 Legge 39.
35 Glasgow: J Maclehose & Sons, 2nd Ed, 1914 at pp 395–398.
36 William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta – A Commentary on the Great Charter of 
King John (J Maclehose & Sons, 2nd Ed, Glasgow, 1914) at p 398.
37 See his The Second Part of the Institute of the Lawes of England (London: Printed by 
Miles Fletcher and Roert Young, for Ephraim Dawson, Richard Meighen, William 
Lee and Daniel Pakeman, 1642), especially at pp 56–57.
38 See paras 10−11 above.
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been introduced into Singapore by way of the Second Charter. However, 
in 1983, this assumption was challenged in the academic literature.39 
Ironically, perhaps, the article concerned was written by an expatriate 
lecturer, Mohan Gopal. Although there was a subsequent response to 
that particular article,40 there was a deafening silence thereafter. Indeed, 
rumour had it that even if Mohan Gopal was correct, this theoretical 
“corrective” did not – and could not – affect (let alone alter) the practical 
basis on which the Singapore legal system was both founded and 
conducted. It cannot be denied that there is much practicality in adopting 
such an approach. However, one ought not to – indeed, cannot – ignore 
the importance of history in general and our “legal roots” in particular. 
An attitude of mind which is merely pragmatic marks the start of the 
slippery slope towards materialism which would (in turn) lead to a whole 
host of other undesirable effects (including the decline of professionalism 
and even professional misconduct).41 Such “legal deterioration” is also, in 
our view at least, both subtle and invidious. This was the main reason why 
the first mentioned author of the present article published a response.42
23 We do not propose to spend too much time on the various 
arguments in the principal articles referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
Indeed, this would militate against the central thrust and spirit of this 
section of the present article – which is to give the reader a simple (albeit 
not simplistic) overview of the Second Charter in the context of the overall 
development of Singapore’s legal system. The main arguments as to why 
the traditional or mainstream view to the effect that the Second Charter 
introduced English law into Singapore is correct from both theoretical 
as well as practical points of view have been dealt with in more detail 
39 See Mohan Gopal, “English Law in Singapore: The Reception That Never Was” 
[1983] 1 MLJ xxv.
40 See Valerie Ong Choo Lin & Ho Kin San, “The Reception That Never Was” (1984) 
5 Sing L Rev 257.
41 And see generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law 
(Butterworths, 1990) ch 3.
42 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “English Law in Singapore: Precedent, Construction 
and Reality or ‘The Reception That Had to Be’” [1986] 2 MLJ civ. This article was in 
fact a modified version of part of a longer piece submitted by the first-mentioned 
author of the present essay in fulfilment of the written work requirement for the 
degree of Master of Laws at the Harvard Law School. Indeed, the delay in the 
response was due to the fact that he had, in the interim, gone abroad for further 
studies. However, that particular stint afforded him, as just stated, the opportunity 
to work on, inter alia, a response to Mohan Gopal’s article.
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elsewhere. Briefly put, they include43 the form of the document,44 the 
interpretation of the “Justice and Right” clause as referring to English 
law (albeit with such law being subject to the concepts of suitability and 
modification),45 the fact that courts in other jurisdictions46 have in fact 
interpreted the phrase “Justice and Right” in their respective Charters 
as having introduced English law into their respective jurisdictions,47 
the fact that the entire tenor of the Second Charter itself (including the 
procedure set out with regard to the initiation of actions, mode of trial as 
well as the execution of judgments) points to the fact that English law was 
intended to be introduced,48 the express reference in the Second Charter 
to English criminal law,49 as well as the natural bias of colonial judges 
towards English law.50
(4) Regulating the quantum of English law received
24 As already alluded to above, the English law received pursuant 
to the Second Charter was nevertheless subject to a “cut-off ” date51 as 
43 Only the main points are mentioned here: there are other points as well which are, 
however, relatively minor in nature (and see Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From 
Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 
2006) at p 17 and, more specifically, Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “English Law in 
Singapore: Precedent, Construction and Reality or ‘The Reception That Had to Be’” 
[1986] 2 MLJ civ at cxiv–cxix).
44 Ie, that whenever the “Justice and Right” clause appeared, this was in a Charter 
(such as the Second Charter of Justice), whereas the more modern “legal vehicle” 
of a statute would tend to refer expressly to the introduction of English law, without 
more: see Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at p 11.
45 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of 
Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at p 11.
46 In India and the Australian state of New South Wales: see generally Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong, “English Law in Singapore: Precedent, Construction and Reality or 
‘The Reception That Had to Be’” [1986] 2 MLJ civ at cvi–cvii.
47 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 11–13.
48 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of 
Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 13–14.
49 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of 
Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 14–15.
50 This is not bias in the pejorative sense but, rather, a reference to, inter alia, the 
methodological and attitudinal approach of judges trained in English law; and see 
generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 15–16.
51 Of 1826, viz, the date of the Second Charter – at least in so far as statutes were 
concerned (see generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy 
– The Second Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 19–22 as 
well as, by the same author, “Of ‘Cut-Off ’ Dates and Domination: Some Problematic 
Aspects of the Reception of English Law in Singapore” (1986) Mal LR 242).
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well as to the concepts of suitability and modification.52 In so far as the 
“cut-off ” date was concerned, this has been interpreted, again in the 
seminal decision of R v Willans, as being 1826, viz, the date of the Second 
Charter. This meant that no post-1826 English statute was received as 
part of Singapore law. However, the situation was less clear with regard 
to English case law. This was due in no small part to what has been 
popularly termed the “declaratory theory” of the common law,53 under 
which the rules and principles of common law and equity are considered 
to have been always “out there”, “waiting” to be “discovered” by the courts 
and are therefore, by their very nature as just described, not susceptible 
of having a “cut-off ” date as such. It should, however, be noted that the 
aforementioned “declaratory theory” is no longer a popular one. The first-
named author has, in fact, discussed this particular issue elsewhere and 
has argued that there is nothing amiss in accepting a “cut-off ” date even 
for the reception of English case law – an approach that is buttressed by 
the fact that the courts also apply to English law the concepts of suitability 
and modification.54
25 The concept of suitability itself meant that English law – whether 
in the form of statute or common law – was not received as part of 
Singapore law unless it was suited to the conditions of Singapore. In so far 
as the concept of modification was concerned, if an English statute or case 
was found to be otherwise suitable to the local circumstances but would, 
if applied, cause injustice or oppression, the statute or case concerned 
could be modified before being received as part of Singapore law.
26 As the first-named author has attempted to demonstrate 
elsewhere, whilst the concepts of suitability and modification were, in 
theory, much to be welcomed (not least because they accorded with the 
much vaunted claim of British colonial justice which purported to ensure 
that the local or native population received the “best of both worlds” 
inasmuch as they received both the developed system of English law and 
justice on the one hand and the recognition as well as preservation of 
viable local laws and customs (where more appropriate)), the practice 
of this ideal was not nearly always as successful.55 However, as general 
concepts in the development of Singapore law in the modern context, 
52 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “Of ‘Cut-Off ’ Dates and Domination: 
Some Problematic Aspects of the Reception of English Law in Singapore” (1986) 
Mal LR 242.
53 And, of course, equity. This theory has its origin in the views of Sir  William 
Blackstone.
54 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 19−26.
55 See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of 
Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 23−25.
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these concepts are of potential as well as actual utility and have now been 
embodied in local statute law in s 3(2) of the Application of English Law 
Act56 (“AELA”).
B. Specific reception of English law57
27 Whilst the Second Charter was responsible for the general 
introduction of English law into Singapore (thus resulting in the general 
reception of English law), there was also the specific reception of English 
law into Singapore. This occurs whenever a local statute or (more 
commonly) a provision thereof provides for (or stipulates that) English 
law be applied. Most of these provisions in these various statutes serve 
gap-filling functions in order to supplement as well as complement the 
concept of general reception. Of all the specific reception provisions, the 
most famous – and most problematic – was s 5 of the Civil Law Act.58 
There were other specific reception provisions as well – for example, what 
is presently s 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code.59 However, s 5 of the 
Civil Law Act was the most significant – and the most problematic. It was 
also of great importance because much of Singapore commercial law 
(arguably the lifeblood of the country) was premised on (and emanated 
from) it. However, the interpretive difficulties it generated were both 
complex as well as intractable. Fortunately, it has since been repealed 
by the AELA. It would serve no real purpose, therefore, to rehearse 
the various difficulties (which are now, of course, largely of historical 
significance only). Further, there is copious literature that examines – 
in minute detail – the historical background as well as the intractable 
difficulties which we have just alluded to.60
56 Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed.
57 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 26−35.
58 Cap 43, 1988 Rev Ed (prior to the repeal of the provision itself, which is described 
briefly below).
59 Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed.
60 See, eg, Andrew B L Phang, “Theoretical Conundrums and Practical Solutions in 
Singapore Commercial Law: A Review and Application of Section  5 of the Civil 
Law Act” (1988) 17 Anglo-American L Rev 251, and the literature cited therein, as 
well as Soon Choo Hock & Andrew Phang, “Reception of English Commercial Law 
in Singapore – A Century of Uncertainty” in The Common Law in Singapore and 
Malaysia (Andrew Harding gen ed) (Butterworths, 1985) ch 2 and Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of Justice (Singapore 
Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 26−35.
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C. Application of English Law Act61
28 The AELA was enacted in 1993.62 Its aim was clear: to clarify the 
application of English law in Singapore. Indeed, prior to the promulgation 
of this Act, there were (as we have alluded to above) numerous areas of 
uncertainty with regard to both the general as well as (especially) the 
specific reception of English law in Singapore.63 This was obviously 
unsatisfactory from both theoretical as well as (more importantly) 
practical points of view.64
29 The AELA has, in fact, done away with many of the problems 
and consequent uncertainty that existed previously. It has therefore 
justifiably been described by the then Minister for Law as “one of the 
most significant law reform measures since Singapore’s independence”.65 
Given its foundational nature, it might even be the most important 
piece of law reform for close to two centuries. Indeed, the AELA was 
also viewed by the minister as being consistent with the development of 
an autochthonous Singapore legal system – an issue to be dealt with in 
greater detail later in this article.66 In particular, the minister stated that 
the Government would be taking further steps to amend the local law 
in order to free it from dependence on English law; he stated that “[w]e 
must have certainty in our laws and move away from reliance on English 
law, because we do not know what the conditions are that shape the U.K. 
decisions”.67 In a similar vein, the minister also observed earlier that 
61 Cap  7A, 1994 Rev Ed. And see generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From 
Foundation to Legacy – The Second Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 
2006) at pp 37−49. For a fascinating insight into the genesis of the Act itself, see 
Chan Sek Keong, “Application of English Law Act 1993 – A New Charter of Justice” 
in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015).
62 As Act No  35 of 1993. The Act came into operation on 12  November 1993 
(see Art 58(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) and 
s 10(2) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed)).
63 Indeed, the Explanatory Statement to the Application of English Law Bill 1993 
(Bill 26 of 1993) began as follows: “This Bill seeks to remove the uncertainty as to 
the extent of the applicability of English law to Singapore, particularly in regard to 
statute law, and to repeal section 5 of the Civil Law Act”. See also the first part of the 
Preamble which states that the Act is “to declare the extent to which English law is 
applicable in Singapore and for purposes connected therewith …”
64 See also G W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 17.
65 Per Prof S Jayakumar during the Second Reading stage of the Application of English 
Law Bill 1993 (Bill 26 of 1993): see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report 
(12 October 1993) vol 61 at col 616.
66 See para 38 below.
67 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (12  October 1993) vol  61 
at col 616 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister for Law and Minister for Home Affairs).
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“it makes our commercial law independent of future legislative changes 
in the United Kingdom – changes which we have in fact no control”.68 The 
minister was, in this last-mentioned regard, probably referring to the very 
real problems centring on the UK’s entry into the European Community, 
which problems were in fact perceived as far back as 1979 when the Civil 
Law Act was amended.69
30 At the most general level, the AELA not only reiterates that the 
rules and principles of English common law and equity are applicable in 
Singapore70 but also (and more importantly) attempts, as far as possible, 
to encompass all the applicable English statutes by either listing them71 or 
by effecting amendments to local statutes based, in the main, on specific 
provisions of English legislation.72 As already mentioned, s 5 of the Civil 
Law Act was repealed as, with the AELA, it was no longer required.73 
There is a provision for flexibility that may be implemented by the 
minister on advice of the Law Revision Commissioners.74
31 There are, however, interpretive as well as other difficulties that 
arise from the AELA. Constraints of space preclude a detailed discussion 
in the present article.75 However, notwithstanding these difficulties, 
the AELA was (and continues to be) a landmark statute in every sense of 
the word. It eradicates – once and for all – the uncertainty surrounding the 
applicability of English statutes in Singapore, commercial or otherwise. 
Certainty and accessibility are thereby improved. Indeed, there is also 
provision for the publication of a (local) revised edition of the English 
68 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (12  October 1993) vol  61 
at col 609 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister for Law and Minister for Home Affairs); see 
also at cols 611 and 613.
69 See the Civil Law (Amendment No  2) Act 1979 (Act No  24 of 1979) – which 
merely served to exacerbate, rather than solve, the problems concerned. See also 
R H Hickling, “Civil Law (Amendment No. 2) Act 1979, s 5 of the Civil Law Act: 
Snark or Boojum?” (1979) 21 Mal LR 351.
70 See s  3 of the Application of English Law Act (Cap  7A, 1994 Rev Ed) (“AELA”). 
Section 3(2) of the AELA incorporated the doctrines of suitability and modification.
71 See s 4 read with the First Schedule to the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 
1994 Rev Ed).
72 See s 7 read with the Second Schedule to the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 
1994 Rev Ed).
73 See s 6(1) of the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed).
74 See s 8 of the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed).
75 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 43–48. Reference may also 
be made to Andrew Phang, “Cementing the Foundations: The Singapore Application 
of English Law Act 1993” (1994) 28 Univ British Columbia L Rev 205. But cf Chan 
Sek Keong, “Application of English Law Act 1993 – A New Charter of Justice” in 
Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015), especially at p 74.
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statutes listed in the First Schedule to the AELA.76 Publication in this 
regard has since taken place.
32 Taken as a whole, the AELA works to the benefit of legal 
practitioners as well as judges alike. Indeed, even students will benefit 
as they will no longer have to grapple with the intricate complexities and 
difficulties surrounding both the general as well as specific reception of 
English law.
33 The enduring legacy of the AELA is clear – it has cemented the 
legal foundation, stabilising as well as setting the stage for autochthonous 
or indigenous development of the Singapore legal system.
D. Singapore law in a colonial setting
(1) Legislation77
34 As we have already noted above, pre-1826 English statutes were 
(subject to the concepts of suitability and modification) part of Singapore 
law by virtue of the Second Charter. English commercial statutes were 
received via s 5 of the Civil Law Act, although, as we have also noted, 
this particular provision engendered no small amount of complexity and 
consequent confusion as well as uncertainty.
35 It should be noted that, although a colony, there was also, in the 
Straits Settlements (of which Singapore was a part), a Legislative Council. 
Many pieces of ostensibly local legislation, though, had their roots in 
other sources. For example, the main piece of criminal law legislation, the 
Penal Code,78 is Indian in origin, as is the Evidence Act79 (which applies 
to both civil as well as criminal cases alike) and the Criminal Procedure 
Code.80
(2) The common law
36 The rules as well as principles of common law and equity 
were, as we have already noted, received via the Second Charter and 
were (technically at least) subject to the concepts of suitability and 
76 See s 9 of the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed). See also s 18 of 
the Revised Edition of the Laws Act (Cap 275, 1985 Rev Ed).
77 For the most comprehensive account, see G W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in 
Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1.
78 Presently Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
79 Presently Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed.
80 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “Of Codes and Ideology: Some Notes on 
the Origins of the Major Criminal Enactments of Singapore” (1989) 31 Mal LR 46.
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modification. What is of significance, though, is the fact that these rules 
and principles were based almost wholly on English law and what local 
decisions there were in fact “carbon copies” of the English law.81 This is no 
criticism of those decisions and is not surprising given the colonial status 
of Singapore.
(3) Conclusion
37 Singapore became a separate Crown Colony in 1946 and was later 
briefly part of Malaysian (from 16 September 1963 to 9 August 1965). All 
throughout the period from the British founding of Singapore (in 1819) 
to independence (on 9 August 1965), one could reasonably characterise 
the Singapore legal system as being based, in the main, on English law – 
with very little (if any) indigenous or autochthonous development of the 
legal system as a whole. We turn now to the development of Singapore 
law from independence to the present day.
IV. From independence to the present day
A. Introduction
38 As the first-named author has argued elsewhere, the development 
of an autochthonous or indigenous system of Singapore law is of the first 
importance. This is so for a number of reasons.82 Put in the briefest of 
fashions, the first is to build as well as reinforce the spirit of professionalism 
and service within the legal profession. Secondly, Singapore law needs to 
be developed in a manner that is consistent with the needs and mores 
of Singapore society itself – and this is accomplished at the level of both 
logic as well as societal needs (a point to which we will return below when 
we consider some illustrations with regard to the qualitative development 
of Singapore law).83 The third (albeit more subsidiary) reason relates to 
national pride (although it does in fact overlap with the first, viz,  the 
argument from professionalism). Finally, there is also the need to 
maintain the legitimacy of the law, particularly from the perspective of 
the public. It is something that cannot be underestimated and is perhaps 
the most vital component and one of the cornerstones of the legal 
system. It is nevertheless important at this juncture to emphasise that 
legal autochthony should not be pursued for its own sake because that 
81 And see generally, Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law 
(Butterworths, 1990) ch 3.
82 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, From Foundation to Legacy – The Second 
Charter of Justice (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 55−64.
83 See paras 80−130 below.
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would constitute mere legal parochialism. Indeed, even as Singapore law 
develops independently of (primarily) English law, it is also important to 
recognise that Singapore will always seek perspectives from elsewhere to 
aid in its development, including from the English. Thus, whilst there has 
been progress, the development of Singapore law has – as we shall see – 
occurred only gradually since independence.
B. The need for pragmatism
39 Singapore became an independent nation state on 9  August 
1965. It was a sudden development. What was therefore required 
was – in a nutshell – both continuity as well as confidence; this was an 
entirely pragmatic approach to adopt and most appropriate, in fact, in 
the circumstances. There was therefore no luxury of time during which 
Singapore law could even begin to be developed in any meaningful 
fashion. Hearings had to continue with the existing (in the main, 
English) law and appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
were retained in order to bolster confidence in the Singapore legal system 
(particularly in the context of commercial transactions). Further, the 
Faculty of Law of the then University of Singapore not only was the only 
local law school then but was also in its relative infancy, having only 
seen through its fifth cohort of graduates, and literature on local law was 
understandingly sparse.84 English law was still deeply entrenched in not 
only the substantive content but also the psyche of the Singapore legal 
system.
40 However, the first-named author has also suggested elsewhere 
that excessive materialism may also have contributed to a general lack 
of interest in the development of Singapore law (and, consequently, an 
overreliance on English law). The reasons for this are complex and were 
rooted in the broader societal context.85 However, even if this particular 
hypothesis is discounted or even disregarded, there were (as noted 
in the preceding paragraph) other reasons as well that explained why 
a more pragmatic approach was – or even had to be – taken towards the 
development of Singapore law.
84 Though cf the impressive volume under the general editorship of the founding Dean 
of the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore, Professor L A Sheridan: 
see Malaya and Singapore, the Borneo Territories – The Development of Its Laws and 
Constitution (London: Steven, 1961).
85 See generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law 
(Butterworths, 1990) ch 3.
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C. Clearing the backlog
41 Another important prerequisite before courts can even begin 
to contemplate developing the law is a system in which there are no 
backlogs.86 When Yong Pung How CJ assumed office in 1990, he candidly 
remarked as follows:87
Presently, however, we have the problem of a large and embarrassing backlog, 
which will need to be resolved with rather more realism and energy.
42 In addition to laying the foundations for the indigenous or 
autochthonous development of Singapore law, there were other good 
reasons for clearing the backlog of cases expeditiously; again, in the 
words of Yong CJ:88
As Singapore becomes an international business and financial centre, the 
slowness of the court system should not be a drag on the country’s future 
development.
43 Approximately five years later, Yong CJ was able to observe 
(with regard to the problem of backlog) thus:89
Today, the backlog problem is behind us, both at the Supreme Court and the 
Subordinate Courts level. For over two years already we have maintained a 
short waiting time of two to three months for the trial or hearing of our cases. 
In fact, the average total time taken for a civil suit to be disposed of has dropped 
from five years in January 1991 to between one and two years now.
44 A multifaceted approach was adopted in order to clear the 
massive backlog at the Supreme Court, including the appointment of 
more judges as well as Judicial Commissioners, strict case-management, 
the appointment of Justices’ Law Clerks, the reform as well as merger of 
the Rules of Court,90 the introduction of information technology (notably 
86 See generally Andrew Phang, “The Singapore Legal System – History, Theory and 
Practice” (2000–2001) 21 Sing L Rev 23 at 33−40 (which we draw from liberally for 
this part of the article).
87 See “Speech Delivered at the Chief Justice’s Welcome Reference – 8 October 1990” in 
Speeches and Judgments of Chief Justice Yong Pung How (FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, 
Singapore, 1996) at p 27.
88 See “Speech Delivered at the Opening of the Legal Year – 4 January 1992” in Speeches 
and Judgments of Chief Justice Yong Pung How (FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, Singapore, 
1996) at p 45.
89 See “Speech Delivered at the Sixth Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacifi 
in Beijing, People’s Republic of China – 17 August 1995” in Speeches and Judgments 
of Chief Justice Yong Pung How (FT Law  &  Tax Asia Pacific, Singapore, 1996) at 
p 181. See also “Speech Delivered at the Opening of the Legal Year 1996 – 6 January 
1996” in the same work at p 211.
90 Presently Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed.
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in the form of a “technology court”, electronic filing of documents, and 
the immensely useful LawNet database), as well as encouraging the 
settlement of disputes via (inter alia) various methods of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (“ADR”). A similar approach was adopted to clear the 
massive backlog at the Subordinate Courts,91 including the appointment 
of more judicial officers over the years, strict case-management, the 
increase of civil jurisdiction, the building of more courts, the introduction 
of information technology, the allowance of more efficient and automated 
settlements of minor offences (such as traffic offences), as well as the 
introduction of the Primary Dispute Resolution Centre (for the effective 
implementation of ADR).
45 In summary, with the clearance of the backlog in the courts, the 
way was now clear for the development of Singapore law in a meaningful 
way as and when the opportunity arose. The clearing of the aforementioned 
backlog is an achievement of the first importance for, absent this, there 
would have been no opportunity whatsoever for the development of an 
indigenous system of Singapore law, let alone the developments that 
have in fact been achieved (as set out briefly below).92 This particular 
achievement may, without any exaggeration whatsoever, be likened to the 
laying of the foundations upon which the present structure of Singapore 
law rests. The effort expended in digging such foundations ought not to 
be underestimated – it is really arduous work and the result, whilst so 
important, is not immediately obvious; continuing our metaphor, it lies 
beneath the surface, so to speak, even whilst it provides the stability upon 
which a unique (here, Singaporean) legal system can – and is being – 
built. Unfortunately, the architect of that reform, Yong CJ, passed away 
earlier this year.93 Yong CJ was a true giant of the Singapore legal system, 
whose legacy should never be forgotten.
D. Developing Singapore law
(1) Introduction
46 By way of recapitulation, the early years since independence on 
9 August 1965 did not witness much local or indigenous development of 
Singapore law simply because, in the initial years after independence, a 
pragmatic approach had to be adopted, particularly in light of the sudden 
birth of Singapore as an independent nation. Further, the backlogs in the 
courts had also to be taken care of before indigenous development of 
91 Now known as the State Courts.
92 See paras 80–130 below.
93 Selina Lum, “Singapore’s Former Chief Justice Yong Pung How Dies, Aged 93” 
The Straits Times (9 January 2020).
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Singapore law could begin to gather pace. This explains – in large part – 
why much of the local or indigenous development of Singapore law in its 
various aspects took place in more intensity only within the last couple of 
decades or so.
47 In this part of the article, we attempt to furnish the reader with 
a snapshot of the development of Singapore law. However, constraints 
of space preclude what would otherwise be a book-length study. Indeed 
(and on a related note), many of the key developments in various areas of 
Singapore law have, in fact, been already covered in a quite comprehensive 
manner in any event in an excellent volume of essays to which reference 
has already been made.94 We nevertheless hope to proffer an analysis 
which adds to that magisterial study in at least three ways. First (and as 
already mentioned), the analysis here is a snapshot that has its uses as a 
primer as well as an encouragement to the reader to delve further into the 
volume just mentioned. Secondly, there are updates of sorts (although 
the work referred to is itself quite up to date). Finally, we offer a fresh 
empirical analysis that would hopefully be of interest to the reader. And it 
is to that particular analysis that our attention now turns.
(2) An empirical analysis
48 The story of Singapore law is usually told with words, but it can 
also be told with numbers. This section aims to animate the development of 
Singapore law by providing an empirical view of Singapore’s legal history, 
building on emerging techniques in data visualisation and empirical legal 
studies. We clarify at the outset that the empirics presented in this section 
are meant only in support, rather than be in substitution, of the qualitative 
analyses that both precede as well as follow this part.
(a) Background
49 Some context on the data collected is necessary to properly 
interpret this part. To catalogue the most comprehensive story possible, 
we collected data on all reported judgments available on LawNet 
attributable to the Singapore Supreme Court (and its predecessors) up 
till 31 December 2017. These cases were identified by setting the relevant 
parameters on LawNet’s advanced search function and subsequently 
downloaded using a computer program written by the third-named 
author for this specific purpose.95 Because post-independence cases 
94 See Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan  &  Paul Tan gen  eds) 
(Academy Publishing, 2015), as well as n 5 above.
95 This was done with express permission from the Singapore Academy of Law, such 
permission being limited to research purposes only.
  
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
contained a relatively uniform mark-up structure, the variables necessary 
for this study could be extracted using purpose-built Python scripts 
as well.96
50 Automated extraction was less straightforward for 
pre-independence cases which (not surprisingly, perhaps) lacked such 
a uniform data structure. Thus, for the around 1,500 pre-independence 
reported cases downloaded from LawNet, a combination of human and 
machine effort was used to encode the data in specific variables. Purpose-
built Python scripts performed the first cut, extracting fields such as case 
name and citation (that tended to be relatively uniformly expressed), while 
five law student assistants from the Singapore Management University 
School of Law aided in (a)  eliminating repeated or non-Singapore 
cases; (b) verifying the machine-extracted data; and (c) extracting more 
challenging variables such as the citations of the any precedents cited and 
the legal subject matter(s) of the case.
51 The student assistants were given detailed instructions on how to 
extract this data and were closely supervised by us in the process. As a full 
description of the data collection methodology would unduly lengthen 
this section, further details are furnished in Appendix A. For present 
purposes, two caveats must be made. First, although the machine-
extracted variables were sample-checked for accuracy, it is possible that 
errors remain. However, these errors are likely to be rare and should not 
undermine the analysis. Notably, the alternative method of manually 
extracting all data fields for all cases would, practical concerns aside, not 
guarantee perfectly accurate data as well (not least because of human 
error, which the present procedure in fact avoids).
52 Indeed, the second caveat is that the manually extracted 
data contains elements of subjectivity in so far as human judgment is 
necessarily implicated in the process. For example, two reasonable lawyers 
might differ on whether a case which implicates criminal procedure also 
implicates evidence. Somewhat surprisingly, there was also scope for 
reasonable disagreement in the number of cases cited by pre-independence 
judgments. This arose because historical judgments occasionally 
provided incomplete references and/or bibliographic information for the 
cases they referred to. Thus, it was at times unclear whether the judgment 
was referring to a case already cited, or an entirely new case. Although 
students were instructed to make reasonable endeavours, including 
performing searches on LawNet, Lexis, and Westlaw for seemingly 
96 The third-named author describes the process for doing so in prior work. See Jerrold 
Soh, “A Network Analysis of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s Citations to Precedent” 
(2019) 31 SAcLJ 246 at 258–262, paras 29–36.
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overlapping case citations, not all uncertainties could be resolved as such. 
Further, the headnotes of some pre-independence cases contained case 
references not to be found in the reported judgment itself. Therefore, case 
citations had to be counted with some discretion, considering the totality 
of what the headnotes and the judgment text suggested.
53 Turning now to the precise scope of data collected, the cut-off 
date of 31 December 2017 was set as a matter of practicality. The dataset 
was obtained early in 2019, and we were mindful of the possibility that 
some judgments handed down in 2018 might not have been edited 
and uploaded onto LawNet as of yet. Further, adding newly uploaded 
judgments to the dataset whilst data collection and analysis was ongoing 
added much volatility to the process. We therefore decided to trade 
off having the most recent cases possible against performing a stable 
and robust analysis. Thus, the dataset covers theoretically all 198 years 
between Singapore’s founding in 1819 and 2017. In practice, however, the 
earliest reported decision available on LawNet only dates to 1877.97 Thus, 
there are, effectively, only 141 years covered in the study, and the period 
between 1819 and 1877 is not covered by this part of the article. Within 
this time frame there were 1,441 judgments from the pre-independence 
period, and a further 7,221  judgments for the post-independence 
period.98 Further, we focused on reported cases for essentially the same 
reasons stated by the second-named author in prior work.99 In any event, 
all of the pre-independence Singapore judgments available on LawNet 
are reported judgments. Finally, the ambit of “Singapore Supreme Court 
and its predecessors” includes Privy Council decisions on appeal from 
Singapore, as well as historical courts that can be associated with the 
High Court level and above.100
97 R v Tan Sin Hap (1808–1884) 3 Ky 94.
98 The post-independence period includes Singapore Day itself.
99 Goh Yihan & Paul Tan, “An Empirical Study on the Development of Singapore Law” 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ 176 at 197–198, paras 41–43 (noting that the Singapore Law Reports 
“provide the most reliable and consistent reports of local cases” and that “reported 
cases perhaps provide the most significant influence on our jurisprudence”).
100 Specifically, the following courts were covered:
(a) the Court of Judicature of the Straits Settlements. Note however that, 
although theoretically included, no reported Singapore LawNet judgment 
originates from this court;
(b) the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements (“SCSS”). This includes both 
original decisions of the SCSS and decisions of the Court of Appeal of the SCSS;
(c) the Federal Court of Malaysia (“FCMY”). This applies only for cases 
decided between 16 September 1963 and 9 August 1965;
(d) the Federal Court of Singapore;
(e) the High Court; and
(f) the Court of Appeal and the historical Court of Criminal Appeal.
 Some of these courts, such as the SCSS and FCMY, could conceivably have heard 
cases from non-Singapore jurisdictions. Because jurisdiction was one of the variables 
(cont’d on the next page)
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54 The result of this process is a comprehensive dataset that catalogues 
the following data points for every reported Singapore Supreme Court 
(and equivalent) judgment in Singapore’s history available on LawNet:
(a) case citation(s) and title;
(b) decision date;
(c) jurisdiction;
(d) court level;
(e) case subject matter(s);
(f) citation(s) of every precedent referred to by that 
judgment, further categorised into either foreign or local citation, 
from which the number of local and foreign citations could be 
derived; and
(g) word count.101
55 Although LawNet may not contain every reported Singapore 
judgment (particularly pre-independence judgments), the dataset 
compiled, and the numbers that follow, represent, to our knowledge, the 
most extensive empirical dataset for the study of Singapore case law to 
date.
(b) The development of Singapore law
56 We start by extending the analysis conducted in Goh and Tan to 
the entire time frame covered in our new dataset. The following Figure 
in our dataset, we could safely exclude non-Singapore judgments. The FCMY 
judgments were manually double-checked to ensure that they involved Singapore 
cases as well.
101 Following the third-named author’s approach in Jerrold Soh, “A Network Analysis 
of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s Citation to Precedent” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 246, word 
counts were derived automatically using purpose-built computer scripts which 
(a) extracted text from the HTML version of the downloaded LawNet judgments; 
and (b)  split the texts into individual counts before counting them. Note that 
although step (a) relies on each judgment’s HTML structure to exclude headnotes 
and other front matter and end matter not properly part of the judgment, it may 
have been both over- and under-inclusive. Step (b) relies on spaces between words 
to count them. The word counts may thus differ from a manual process that, for 
instance, relies on human judgment to isolate which part(s) of the text properly 
form the “judgment”, and on commercial word processing software for word counts. 
Nonetheless, because all judgments were treated consistently, any errors in the word 
counts do not undermine relative comparisons between judgments. The exposition 
on word counts is written, and should be interpreted, in this light. In any event, we 
also subjected the word counts to random manual checks.
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1 illustrates the yearly total number of cases as well as local and foreign 
citations across the years.
 
Figure 1: Yearly total number of citations in Singapore reported 
judgments, 1877–2017
57 Figure  1 above encapsulates 141  years of legal history. 
Immediately noticeable from the dotted trendline is how most of the 
pre-independence judgments originate from the post-1930s period. 
In other words, either there were very few published judgments before 
that, or the LawNet database has very few of these judgments available. 
There is also a clear and noticeable valley representing three years of the 
Japanese Occupation, where there were close to no published judgments. 
The number of reported judgments quickly picked up after the war, but 
stayed relatively stable from then till the end-1980s at about 50 per year. 
But the 1990s saw a stark increase in the number of judgments reported. 
At the same time, local cases began to be cited more frequently, forming 
a larger proportion of the total number of citations (though, to be sure, 
a majority of the cases cited were still foreign ones). This is made clear 
by the relative proportion of each shade in the figure. This time period 
coincides neatly with the period where a concerted effort to develop the 
autochthony of the Singapore legal system arose.102 To recall, the AELA 
was enacted in 1993. The 1990s were also a time where Singapore law 
sought to position itself as a regional lex mercatoria.103 The Supreme 
Court Practice Statement issued in 1994 abolished appeals to the UK 
Privy Council and cemented the Singapore Court of Appeal’s position 
102 Described at paras 28–33 above.
103 For a discussion on this ambition, see generally Report of the Committee to 
Develop the Singapore Legal Sector: Final Report (September 2007) (Chairperson: 
V K  Rajah JA).
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as the highest court in the land.104 Our empirical study here confirms the 
significance of these developments for the evolution of Singapore law.
58 Figure 1 also suggests that citations as a whole have increased. 
While this may support the hypothesis that Singapore courts have, over 
the years, made use of more precedents in the judgment writing process, 
the simpler explanation for this is rise in the absolute number of reported 
judgments in our dataset from the 1980s onwards. To adjust for this, 
the following Figure 2 plots the average number of local versus foreign 
citations per case for that year. For instance, in 2017 the average reported 
judgment cites about 15 cases in total, of which an average of nine are 
foreign and five are local.105
 
Figure 2: Yearly average number of citations per Singapore reported 
judgment, 1877–2017
59 Figure 2 reinforces much of the aforementioned: most, though 
not all, citations in the past were to foreign cases.106 Importantly, Figure 2 
also identifies the period from 2012 onwards as another significant 
104 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1994] 2 SLR 689. A more comprehensive 
overview and analysis of the legal-historical significance of the 1990s for Singapore 
may be found in Singapore Law: 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen 
eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) at chs 1 and 2 especially. See also The Legal System 
of Singapore: Institutions, Principles and Practices (Gary Chan Kok Yew & Jack Tsen-
Ta Lee gen eds) (LexisNexis, 2015).
105 To be precise, the average total, foreign and local citations per case are 14.72, 9.93 
and 4.78 respectively. Note that the averages were calculated independently; thus, 
the average total number may not be equal to the sum of the average foreign and the 
average local number.
106 Readers may notice, but should not attach too much meaning to, the large spikes 
observed in the 1910s to the early 1920s. This is a statistical incident of how the 
dataset has few cases from that period (some years had only one or two judgments). 
Small samples make large variances.
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milestone: for the first time in Singapore’s legal history, consistently 
more local than foreign precedents are cited on average. Indeed, there 
are only seven years in our dataset where this occurs: 1882, 2003, 2012, 
2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.107 The achievement of such a milestone 
is likely attributable, at least in part, to the Supreme Court Practice 
Direction issued in 2008, which states that “where there are in existence 
local judgments which are directly relevant to the issue, such judgments 
should be cited in precedent to foreign judgments”.108 It may also be 
attributable more broadly to the growth of the Singapore legal system 
since the passage of the AELA, which itself encouraged the development 
of a body of local jurisprudence.
60 Also of interest is the sharp spike in both foreign and local citations 
beginning in 2002 (marked by the dotted line above). This is suggestive 
of more extensive legal exposition in reported judgments. Word counts 
corroborate this. Figure 3 below illustrates the word count of an average 
case decided in the relevant year.
 
Figure 3: Yearly average word count of Singapore reported judgments, 
1877–2017
61 Figure 3 likewise demonstrates a rapid uptick in word counts from 
2002 onwards. In precise figures, whereas the average reported judgment 
comprised 4,763 words in 2002; by 2008 this had more than doubled to 
11,288, and since then average word counts have hovered around 11,000. 
This may be a proxy for an increase in judgment comprehensiveness and/
or the complexity of cases before the court. The reader may also notice 
107 1882 might not be significant, however, as there was only one reported case that year 
(which cited one local and no foreign judgment). 2003 is also less significant because 
the average number of local cases cited then (3.038) was only marginally higher than 
the average number of foreign cases cited (3.005).
108 Supreme Court Practice Direction No 1 of 2008.
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that the year 1915 stands out as the year with the highest average word 
count in Singapore’s legal history. This is attributable to a single outlier 
case decided that year: N S Narainan Pillay v The Netherlandsche Handel 
Maatschappij.109 That judgment extended to 17,192  words because 
Bucknill CJ, Ebden J, and Edmonds J each delivered a separate judgment. 
As this case was the only judgment in our dataset decided in 1915, it 
wholly determined the average word count for that year. It is therefore by 
no means determinative of the trend of the time.
62 To further tease out the story of Singapore law’s development, 
Figure  4 below visualises statistics similar to that in Figure  2, but in 
a  form inspired by nature. Like rings on a tree, each ring in Figure  4 
represents one calendar year, and the shades of the ring represent the 
foreign/local proportion or share of the citations made across all reported 
cases decided in that year. Whited-out rings represent years without any 
citation information.110
 
Figure 4: Proportion of foreign to local citations in Singapore reported 
judgments, 1877–2017
109 [1934] 1 MLJ 227.
110 This means either that no cases were available for that year (eg, the Japanese 
Occupation years) or that the available cases did not cite any cases at all.
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63 Figure  4 thus provides a cross-sectional look at the living tree 
that is Singapore law. Just as dendrochronologists study natural tree rings 
to uncover insights on natural history,111 so too can we extract lessons 
of legal history from what these citation rings display. To begin, the 
relatively empty “core” of Figure 4 points to the dearth of reported cases 
(available on LawNet) during the formative years of the Singapore legal 
system. The 1930s then saw a brief period of growth, particularly in the 
share of local citations. But this was disrupted by three years of whited-
out rings – these, of course, forming part of the mark left by the Japanese 
Occupation on Singapore law.
64 Interestingly, the increasing trend in local citation shares seemed 
to regain momentum almost immediately after the war. But it was put 
to a stop abruptly the year Singapore gained independence, and local 
citation shares would only recover pre-independence levels in the early 
1980s. The years thereafter are definitive of the Singapore legal system 
as we know it today. As mentioned above, from this period on, local 
citation shares rose rapidly and consistently. Especially after the turn of 
the millennium, local citation shares begin to test, and eventually break 
through, the halfway (50%) point.112 The year 2017, represented by the 
outermost ring, is an outlier in itself: 67.50% of all citations that year were 
citations to local precedent.
65 The observation that the share of local citations increased in the 
late 1950s but fell after independence persists when we partition the data 
by court levels. Figure 5 below charts tree ring diagrams for judgments 
respectively handed down by the Singapore High Court (left) and the 
Singapore Court of Appeal (right), as well as historical equivalents.113 
Also apparent is that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
111 Jessica Stoller-Conrad, “Tree Rings Provide Snapshots of the Earth’s Past Climate” 
NASA (25 January 2017).
112 These are the years pointed out in para  59 above where more local than foreign 
citations arose.
113 The following courts were taken as historical equivalents of the Court of Appeal: the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, the Federal Court of Singapore, the Court of Appeal of 
the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements, and the Court of Criminal Appeal of 
the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. The High Court was only associated 
with the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements (recall that, after 1873, the 
Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements when exercising appellate jurisdiction was 
referred to as the Court of Appeal of the same; thus, judgments associated with the 
Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements simpliciter may be mapped to the High 
Court level). Data from the Federal Court of Malaysia and the Privy Council was not 
used here as it could not be neatly associated with either the Court of Appeal or High 
Court. A minority of (less than 30) cases for which court levels could not be reliably 
identified were also omitted.
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data demonstrates broadly similar citation trends.114 In other words, the 
general shift away from local citations in the 1960s, as well as the shift 
back to local citations in the 1990s, was not limited to the apex appellate 
(law-making) level and also extended to the High Court as well.
 
Figure 5: Proportion of foreign to local citations in Singapore reported 
judgments by court level, 1877–2017
66 The following figures show tree ring diagrams for selected legal 
areas which the authors believe are of general interest.115
114 As further evidence of parallel trends, the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
the local citation shares at the High Court and Court of Appeal levels from 1900 to 
2017 is 0.8096. The correlation coefficient measures the strength of the association 
between two variables. The maximum possible value of 1 suggests the variables are 
perfectly positively correlated: when one increases, the other increases by a perfectly 
proportionate amount (eg, whenever we observe that variable X has increased by 
one unit, we also observe that variable Y rises by five units). The minimum value 
of –1 suggests a perfectly negative association. A coefficient of 0 suggests the two are 
unrelated – observing a higher X tells us nothing about whether to expect a higher, 
lower, or unchanged  Y. However, it should be stressed that correlation does not 
imply causation.
115 These being the areas covered in Singapore Law – 50  Years in the Making (Goh 
Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015).
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Figure 6: Proportion of foreign to local citations in Singapore reported 
judgments by legal area, 1877–2017
67 The diagrams above offer a more granular view of Singapore 
law’s development. At a glance, we can tell which topics have been and/or 
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still are, loosely speaking, more foreign or local in precedential nature.116 
Many of these findings are intuitive. For example, criminal law and 
family law are more “domestic”, in the sense that they have developed 
more in accord with Singapore’s differing social and cultural context, and 
therefore departed from English law. On the other hand, contract law 
and equity are arguably more commercial and thus more homogeneous 
areas of law, which have developed not necessarily in accord with the 
social and cultural context peculiar to criminal law and family law. This 
may reflect how commercial law tends towards harmonisation. While the 
picture is mixed for other subjects, most of them nonetheless exhibit an 
increasing proportion of local to foreign citations as well.
68 The extent to which each topic is whited out also makes for fruitful 
comparison. Whited-out rings here imply either that no judgments in 
that subject arose that year or that there were no cases cited at all by 
the judgments in that subject. For instance, subjects like contract, tort, 
and criminal law are the least whited out, suggesting that cases in these 
areas were relatively common even in the early years, and even at that 
time were more likely to cite precedents. This is perhaps not surprising 
as these subjects fundamentally impact the lives of people generally. On 
the other hand, topics like the conflict of laws and arbitration are more 
whited out because they are, arguably, far more relevant today than in the 
1800s. Across all topics, however, we can clearly observe how whited-out 
rings are generally a thing of the past. Thus, not only do cases in all these 
topics occur at least once every year, but they also tend to cite at least one 
precedent.
(c) Exportation of Singapore Law
69 Just as we are concerned about the development of Singapore 
law internally, so too should we be concerned about the exportation of 
Singapore law. Building on an earlier study, we in this section discuss 
how Singapore law has been exported beyond our shores.117 Just as that 
study omitted Malaysian cases,118 we shall too, for ease of comparison. 
The reason provided then for not including Malaysian cases was because 
Singapore cases had been reported in the Malayan Law Journal (“MLJ”) 
for a long time. As such, there was concern that there might be under-
counting of foreign cases citing Singapore cases bearing an MLJ citation. 
While we have gone some way towards solving that problem by going 
116 Note that cases with more than one subject matter were represented in the tree ring 
diagrams for all the topics they touched on.
117 See Singapore Law – 50  Years in the Making (Goh Yihan  &  Paul Tan gen  eds) 
(Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 16.
118 See Singapore Law – 50  Years in the Making (Goh Yihan  &  Paul Tan gen  eds) 
(Academy Publishing, 2015) at p 834.
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through the several such cases manually, we have, nonetheless, for the 
primary reason of consistency, excluded citations of Singapore cases by 
the Malaysian courts.
70 With this caveat in mind, the first graph below shows the number 
of Singapore cases cited per year in selected foreign jurisdictions from 
1965 to 2019.
 
Figure 7: Total number of citations by foreign courts (excluding 
Malaysian courts)
71 As can be seen, there has been a generally upward trend in the 
citation of Singapore cases by foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, there was a 
particularly sharp increase after 2010, and the accelerated pace of foreign 
citations to local cases continues to the present date.
72 While Figure 7 shows the rate at which foreign courts are citing 
Singapore cases, it does not tell us anything about the nature of the 
Singapore cases being cited. To do this, Figure 8 below investigates the 
year in which the Singapore cases cited by foreign cases were decided.
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Figure 8: Decision year of Singapore cases cited by foreign cases
 
Figure 9: Decision year of Singapore cases cited by foreign cases 
(1965 onwards)
73 As mentioned, the two preceding graphs chart the year of decision 
of Singapore cases cited by foreign cases. As the first graph contains all 
Singapore cases so cited, the data stretched back to 1911; that is to say, 
there was a 1911 decision that was cited by a foreign case. However, it 
may be more meaningful to condense the data to the Singapore cases 
decided from 1965 onwards, which is reflected in the second graph. It 
may be observed that the vast majority of Singapore cases cited by foreign 
cases were decided after 1990. While there are Singapore cases decided 
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before 1990 cited by foreign cases, this makes up for less than half of the 
total number of Singapore cases so cited.
74 Which then are the foreign jurisdictions citing Singapore cases, 
and what is the trend of their doing so?
 
Figure 10: Number of citations of Singapore cases by selected foreign 
jurisdictions
75 Figure  10 shows the citations of Singapore cases by selected 
foreign jurisdictions. If we were to group these jurisdictions to make for 
a less cluttered graph, we can see the following.
 
Figure 11: Number of citations of Singapore cases by selected foreign 
jurisdictions (grouped)
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Figure 12: Heat map of number of citations of Singapore cases by 
selected foreign jurisdictions
76 In order to better visualise the otherwise complicated graph in 
Figure 10, it may be helpful to break down the data in the form of a heat 
map in Figure 12. In this representation, the darker the square, the higher 
the number of citations. Viewed across the years, we can observe the trend 
of citations. Thus, Australian courts appear to have cited Singapore cases 
increasingly over the years, as have Hong Kong and UK courts. However, 
this is more significantly the case for Australian courts. Similarly, we can 
observe a growing number of Indian cases citing Singapore cases, even if 
this trend started only in 2014 or so.
(3) Some qualitative reflections
(a) Development of Singapore law
77 As already alluded to above, constraints of space entail that 
the content of this particular part of the article is presented in a very 
condensed form. It serves as a kind of “appetiser” for the reader whilst 
simultaneously presenting a snapshot of the length, breadth as well as 
depth of local developments that have taken place during a fairly short 
space of time. However, it is, by its very nature, also somewhat subjective, 
although we have sought to remedy (or at least mitigate the effect of) 
any defects in this particular regard by as wide a coverage of topics as 
possible. It has nevertheless not been possible to cover every area of 
the law as such and, indeed, in certain areas (for example, the criminal 
law119 and family law),120 the developments have been primarily statutory 
119 On criminal law generally in Singapore, see S Chandra Mohan, Understanding 
Criminal Law (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2017) and Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan  &  Chan 
Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2018).
120 As to which, see generally Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore 
(LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2018); Debbie Ong, International Issues in Family Law in 
(cont’d on the next page)
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in nature (and have, by their very nature, had less international impact 
whilst nevertheless being fundamental to the Singapore legal system as 
a whole). With these caveats in mind, let us turn to what is, in effect, 
a whistle-stop tour of some of the more recent as well as significant 
developments in Singapore law. However, before proceeding to do so, we 
note that these qualitative reflections complement (at a more specific level) 
the broader empirical analysis in the preceding part of this article.
78 Perhaps the more significant developments have taken place in 
the general law of obligations. That this is so is not, of course, due to any 
intentional plan of action, so to speak, by the Singapore courts. In the 
first place, courts have no control over the cases that come before them. 
It just happened to be the case that many cases that were placed before 
the Singapore courts (in particular, the Singapore Court of Appeal, which 
is the apex court) happened to raise significant legal issues that had to 
be decided as an integral part of the case concerned and/or where (on 
rarer occasions) the court delivered observations that were not definitive 
or conclusive but which arose out of the case concerned and which 
merited some preliminary views. It should also be noted that – as has 
been observed by the first-named author in an extra-judicial context 
(and in the context of the Singapore law of contract)121 – the approach 
adopted by the Singapore courts is one where the court concerned ought 
(especially in novel of developing areas of the law) to search across all 
common law jurisdictions for the principles that are most appropriate to 
the jurisdiction concerned from the perspectives of both logic and local 
conditions.122 Put simply, the Singapore courts engage in the search for 
principle.123 Looked at in this light, comparative analysis is of the first 
importance.124
79 It is also important to emphasise the fact that there ought not to be 
autochthonous or indigenous development merely for its own sake (for that 
would be mere (and wholly undesirable) parochialism). Thus, as we will 
Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2015); as well as Chen Siyuan, “Family Law: Local 
in Law, Guided by Judicial Discretion” in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making 
(Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 9.
121 However, the same approach should apply to other areas of Singapore law as well.
122 See Andrew Phang, “Recent Developments in Singapore Contract Law – The Search 
for Principle” (2011) 28 JCL 1.
123 Borrowing (albeit in a somewhat different context) the title of Lord Goff of Chieveley’s 
justly famous Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence: see Robert Goff, “The Search 
for Principle” (1983) 69 Proceedings of the British Academy 169 (reprinted in The 
Search for Principle – Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (William Swadling 
& Gareth Jones gen eds) (Oxford University Press, 1999) at pp 313−329).
124 See Andrew Phang, “The Law of Remedies – The Importance of Comparative and 
Integrated Analysis” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 746 at 751−765 and (in relation to the specific 
context of remedies) at 748−751.
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see below, although there are clear departures of Singapore law from the 
laws of other countries, this is not done for the sake of being different. In 
a sense, this is simply a consequence of a maturing legal system that has 
now the time to develop its own laws. Indeed, the fact that due regard is 
paid to developments in other jurisdictions is emblematic of an approach 
that eschews parochialism and which endorses as well as embraces 
(suitable) developments in other jurisdictions instead. Moreover, even 
as laws diverge from each other, jurisdictions must now confront the 
problem of the lack of homogeneity in commercial laws.125
(i) Law of torts
80 Turning, then, to a sampling of cases in various areas of Singapore 
law, we commence with the law of tort126 – in particular, the law relating 
to the establishment of a duty of care in negligence. Whilst the law in the 
aforementioned area is relatively uncontroversial where physical harm 
has ensued,127 the same cannot be said where the damage that ensues 
relates to pure economic loss. Indeed, it was only in 1963 that the House 
of Lords extended the law of negligence to cover negligent misstatements 
which caused pure economic loss.128 However, the issue of the scope of 
the duty of care in relation to pure economic loss continued to remain 
problematic. This is not surprising simply because of the very nature of 
pure economic loss itself which, if left unchecked from a legal point of 
view, could lead to unprincipled and, indeed, uncontrolled legal liability. 
What is of the first importance in so far as the present article is concerned 
is that the Singapore Court of Appeal decided, in Spandeck Engineering 
(S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency129 (“Spandeck”). to 
endorse the two-stage test set out by Lord Wilberforce in the House of 
Lords decision in Anns v Merton London Borough Council130 (“Anns”). 
Indeed, the court in Spandeck had endorsed a legal test that had been 
rejected and overruled by a House of Lords decision handed down 
125 See Sundaresh Menon, “Concluding Plenary” at ASEAN Integration Through Law 
(25 August 2013).
126 The leading Singapore work in this field is Gary Chan Kok Yew, The Law of Torts 
in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016). And see, more specifically, Goh 
Yihan, “Law of Torts: Dominant Role of Land Scarcity” in Singapore Law – 50 Years 
in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 11.
127 And see the seminal House of Lords decision of M’Alister (or Donoghue) (Pauper) v 
Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
128 In the (also) seminal House of Lords decision of Hedley Byrne  &  Co Ltd v 
Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465.
129 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100.
130 [1978] AC 728.
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subsequent to Anns in Murphy v Brentwood District Council.131 As the 
first-named author noted in an article published in 2017:132
It has been 10 years since Spandeck was decided and it has now come to be seen 
as a (perhaps the) landmark decision in the Singapore law of torts, generating a 
veritable plethora of legal literature. It has been consistently followed and has, 
to a large extent, succeeded in its goal of providing a universal framework with 
which to examine the existence of a duty of care in all situations.
81 This is not, however, to state that Spandeck is wholly without 
difficulties and/or potential for further development. Indeed, as noted 
in the quotation just set out, the legal literature on the case alone is 
enormous.133 What is germane for the purposes of the present article is 
the fact that Spandeck represents not only a departure from the prevailing 
English law but also an intentional decision to endorse (based on logic 
and principle) English law that had in fact been departed from.
82 And in a related vein, the Singapore Court of Appeal, in See 
Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd,134 decided to cut 
the Gordian knot135 and untie the Singapore law relating to occupiers’ 
liability from the apron strings of the (anachronistic) English law.136 In 
particular, it followed the lead previously taken by the High Court of 
Australia in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna137 and subsumed 
the law on occupiers’ liability under the general law of negligence. Again, 
constraints of space preclude any discussion in any detail.138 It will suffice 
for the purposes of the present article to note that there was not only a 
departure from the existing English common law but also an openness to 
131 [1991] 1 AC 398.
132 See Andrew Phang, “Pure Economic Loss and Reproductive Negligence – The 
Singapore Experience” (2017) 24 Torts LJ 95 at 107−108.
133 See, eg, Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, “Lord Atkin and the Philosopher’s Stone: 
The Search for a Universal Test for Duty” [2007] Sing JLS 350; Kow Keng Wee, 
“Spandeck Engineering Pte Ltd v DSTA: A Casenote” The MINDEF Legal Counsel 
(October 2007) at p 8; A L R Joseph, “Establishing a Duty of Care: Singapore’s Single, 
Two-Stage Test” (2008) 20 SAcLJ 251; Cheng Lim Saw, “Is Anns Alive and Well in 
Singapore?” (2008) 16 Tort L Rev 5; David Tan, “The Salient Features of Proximity: 
Examining the Spandeck Formulation for Establishing a Duty of Care” [2010] Sing 
JLS 459; Colin Liew, “Keeping it Spick and Spandeck: A Singaporean Approach to the 
Duty of Care” (2012) 20 Torts LJ 1; as well as David Tan & Goh Yihan, “The Promise 
of Universality – The Spandeck Formulation Half a Decade on” (2013) 25 SAcLJ 510.
134 [2013] 3 SLR 284.
135 ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 284 at [52].
136 ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 284 at [75].
137 (1987) 162 CLR 479.
138 For further analysis, see Low Kee Yang, “Occupiers’ Liability after See Toh: 
Change, Uncertainty and Complexity” [2013] Sing JLS 457 and Kumaralingam 
Amirthalingam, “Occupier’s Liability and Negligence: Of Gordian Knots and Apron 
Strings” (2013) 25 SAcLJ 580.
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(as well as endorsement of) developments in other jurisdictions (in this 
case, Australia).
83 Another decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal that turned 
on a novel point of law is ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd.139 In this case, 
the plaintiff and her husband had sought to conceive a child through in 
vitro fertilisation (“IVF”). The plaintiff underwent IVF treatment and 
delivered a daughter. After the birth of the daughter, it was discovered that 
a terrible mistake had occurred: the plaintiff ’s ovum had been fertilised 
using the sperm from an unknown third party instead of sperm from the 
plaintiff ’s husband. The plaintiff sued the defendants, the private hospital 
which had provided the IVF treatment and other related parties, in tort 
and contract and sought damages for, inter alia, the expenses she would 
incur in raising her daughter (“upkeep costs”). The defendants conceded 
liability but argued that the plaintiff should not be permitted to recover 
upkeep costs as the child was a blessing and that there was something 
distasteful (if not morally offensive) in treating the birth of a normal, 
healthy child as a matter for compensation. The reasoning of the court 
was very detailed and complex. Whilst the court did not award upkeep 
costs to the plaintiff, it awarded the plaintiff damages for loss of “genetic 
affinity”.140 This was quite a novel approach. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
this particular decision has witnessed comment in a wide variety of 
international journals141 and has even been reported beyond the shores 
of Singapore.142
139 [2017] 1 SLR 918.
140 For a more detailed summary, see Andrew Phang, “Pure Economic Loss and 
Reproductive Negligence – The Singapore Experience” (2017) 24  Torts LJ 95 
at 113−124.
141 See, eg, Kumaralingam Amirthalingam “Reproductive Negligence: Unwanted Child 
or Unwanted Parenthood?” (2018) 134 LQR 15; Tom Foxton, “Inaccurate Conception: 
ACB v Thomson Medical” (2018) 81 MLR 337; Jordan English & Mohammud Jaamae 
Hafeez-Baig, “Recovery of Upkeep Costs, Claims for Loss of Autonomy and Loss 
of Genetic Affinity: Fertile Ground for Development?” (2018) 41 Melbourne Univ 
L Rev 1360; and Craig Purshouse, “Autonomy, Affinity, and the Assessment of 
Damages: ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 20 and Shaw v Kovak [2017] 
EWCA Civ 1028” (2017) 26 Med L Rev 675. Reference may also be made to Tsachi 
Keren–Paz, “Gendered Injustice in Compensating Injury to Autonomy in English 
and Singaporean Negligence Law” (2018) Feminist Legal Studies (Published online 
on 22  November 2018) and Tracey Tomlinson, “Negligent Disruption of Genetic 
Planning: Carving out a New Tort Theory to Address Novel Questions of Liability in 
an Era of Reproductive Innovation” (2019) 87 Fordham L Rev Online 113.
142 In, for example, [2018] Med LR 55.
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(ii) Law of contract
84 Turning to the law of contract, we find a number of instances 
in which Singapore law has developed independently.143 In the law of 
common mistake, for example, the Singapore Court of Appeal, in Chwee 
Kin Keong v DigilandMall.com Pte Ltd,144 endorsed not only the doctrine 
of mistake at common law but also the doctrine of mistake in equity. 
Although this particular case concerned, strictly speaking, the doctrine 
of unilateral (as opposed to common) mistake, the general reasoning 
applied with equal force to the doctrine of common mistake.145 This 
particular legal position can be contrasted with that which currently 
obtains in the English context, where the English Court of Appeal, 
in Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd,146 
endorsed only the doctrine of common mistake at common law, choosing 
not to recognise the doctrine of common mistake in equity (which had 
hitherto been endorsed by the (also) English Court of Appeal decision of 
Solle v Butcher).147
143 And see generally The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong 
gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) as well as Andrew Phang & Goh Yihan, Contract 
Law in Singapore (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012). And see, more specifically, 
Peh Aik Hin, “Contract Law: A Rationalisation Process towards Coherence and 
Fairness” in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) 
(Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 10.
144 [2005] 1  SLR(R) 502. See also the recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision of 
Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110, where 
Chwee Kin Keong v DigilandMall.com Pte Ltd was cited in the context of the doctrine 
of unilateral mistake in equity.
145 In fact, a leading contract textbook has stated that the Court of Appeal in Chwee 
Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 502 “hinted” that it might 
not follow Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd [2003] QB 679 
in abolishing common mistake in equity: see Chitty on Contracts (Hugh G Beale 
gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Ed, 2018) at p 641, fn 236; see also Lee Pey Woan, 
“Unilateral Mistake in Common Law and Equity − Solle v Butcher Reinstated” (2006) 
22 JCL 81 at 88. Though cf the Singapore High Court decision of Chwee Kin Keong 
v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 at [130], per V K Rajah JC (as he 
then was). Reference may also be made to Andrew Phang, “Contract Formation and 
Mistake in Cyberspace – The Singapore Experience” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 361 and, by the 
same author, “Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace” (2005) 21 JCL 197; 
as well as Yeo Tiong Min, “Unilateral Mistake in Contract: Five Degrees of Fusion of 
Common Law and Equity” [2004] Sing JLS 227 and Kwek Mean Luck, “Law, Fairness 
and Economics – Unilateral Mistake in Digilandmall” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 411.
146 [2003] QB 679.
147 [1950] 1  KB 671. Reference may also be made to Andrew Phang  &  Goh Yihan, 
“Contract Law in Commonwealth Countries: Uniformity or Divergence?” (2019) 
31 SAcLJ 170 at 187−192.
  
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
85 Indeed, the Court of Appeal had the opportunity in Quoine Pte 
Ltd v B2C2 Ltd,148 a case on appeal from the Singapore International 
Commercial Court,149 to chart a new course in the application of common 
mistake (and unilateral mistake) in a situation involving algorithmic 
trading. In this case, the parties entered into several transactions based 
on algorithms created by Quoine Pte Ltd (“Quoine”) on the latter’s 
platform. Unfortunately, due to Quoine failing to update the settings of 
its platform, the algorithms executed a series of trades at predetermined 
but extremely advantageous terms in favour of B2C2 Ltd. Quoine sought 
to rescind the resulting contracts, arguing that the doctrines of, inter 
alia, common mistake and unilateral mistake should come to its aid. 
In a majority judgment, the Court of Appeal held that these doctrines 
will not avoid the affected contracts. In so far as common mistake is 
concerned, there was simply no shared mistaken assumption as to the 
price of the transactions. As for unilateral mistake, the court held the 
relevant question to be whether, when programming the algorithm, the 
programmer was doing so with actual or constructive knowledge of 
the fact that the relevant offer would only ever be accepted by a party 
operating under a mistake and whether the programmer was acting to 
take advantage of such a mistake. Since the programmer did not have the 
requisite actual or constructive knowledge, unilateral mistake could not 
assist Quoine. The broader point from this case, though, is to illustrate the 
Singapore courts’ responsiveness towards the adaptation of traditional 
doctrines to novel situations brought about by advances in technology.
86 In another important area of contract law, that concerning 
“terms implied in fact”, the Singapore Court of Appeal, in both Foo Jong 
Peng v Phua Kiah Mai150 as well as Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings 
Pte Ltd,151 declined to follow the approach proffered by Lord Hoffmann 
in the Privy Council decision of Attorney General of Belize v Belize 
Telecom Ltd152 (“Belize”) in so far as he sought to recast implication as 
148 [2020] SGCA(I) 2.
149 See B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] 4 SLR 17.
150 [2012] 4 SLR 1267.
151 [2013] 4 SLR 193.
152 [2009] 1  WLR 1988 (on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Belize). Reference 
may also be made to a recent piece by Lord Hoffmann, “Language and Lawyers” 
(2018) 134 LQR 553. Indeed, the literature itself on Attorney General of Belize v 
Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988 (“Belize”) is copious: see, eg, Kelvin Low & 
Kelry Loi, “The Many ‘Tests’ for Terms Implied in Fact” (2009) 125  LQR  561; 
Paul  S  Davies, “Recent Developments in the Law of Implied Terms” [2010] 
LMCLQ 140; John McCaughran, “Implied Terms: The Journey of the Man on the 
Clapham Omnibus” (2011) 70(3) Camb LJ 607; John W Carter, “The Implication 
of Contractual Terms: Problems with Belize Telecom” (2013) 27(3) CLQ 3; Wayne 
Courtney & John W Carter, “Implied Terms: What Is the Role of Construction?” 
(2014) 31  JCL 151; Richard Hooley, “Implied Terms after Belize Telecom” (2014) 
(cont’d on the next page)
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interpretation (relegating the “business efficacy” and “officious bystander” 
tests to a less than central role in the context of “terms implied in fact”). 
Once again, constraints of space preclude a detailed discussion and the 
reader is referred to the relevant literature cited above,153 although it 
may be noted that the UK Supreme Court has, in Marks and Spencer 
plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd,154 seemingly 
disagreed with Lord  Hoffmann’s view in Belize (citing, inter alia, both 
the aforementioned Singapore Court of Appeal decisions). As in the case 
of common mistake, the Singapore Court of Appeal actually chose to 
endorse the position under then existing English law. Indeed, this was 
also the approach adopted in respect of the topic of remoteness of damage 
– to which our attention very briefly turns.
87 The law relating to remoteness of damage in contract law was – 
for the longest time –well settled and was based on the test laid down by 
Alderson B in the celebrated English decision of Hadley v Baxendale.155 
Indeed, that statement of principle was endorsed by the Singapore Court 
of Appeal itself as late as 2008 in Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v 
Steen Consultants Pte Ltd156 (“Robertson Quay”). However, in the House 
of Lords decision in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The 
Achilleas)157 (which was handed down a mere four months after the decision 
in Robertson Quay had been handed down), Lord Hoffmann introduced 
an apparently new legal criterion to the existing law, viz, whether or not 
the defendant concerned had assumed responsibility for the loss which 
had occurred as a result of its breach. However, after considering the 
relevant arguments both for as well as against such an approach in some 
detail, the Singapore Court of Appeal, in MFM  Restaurants Pte Ltd v 
Fish  &  Co Restaurants Pte Ltd,158 rejected this approach and endorsed 
the seminal principle laid down in Hadley instead. This approach was 
73(2) Camb LJ 315; Andrew Phang, “The Challenge of Principled Gap-Filling: 
A  Study of Implied Terms in a Comparative Context” [2014] JBL 263; David 
McLauchlan, “Construction and Implication: In Defence of Belize Telecom” [2014] 
LMCLQ 203; and John W Carter & Wayne Courtney, “Belize Telecom: A Reply to 
Professor McLauchlan” [2015] LMCLQ 245. An excellent summary of Belize and 
subsequent developments is to be found in Richard Austen-Banker, Implied Terms 
in English Contract Law (Elgar Commercial Law and Practice, 2nd  Ed, 2017) 
at paras 7.54−7.69.
153 At n  152 above. Reference may also be made to Andrew Phang  &  Goh Yihan, 
“Contract Law in Commonwealth Countries: Uniformity or Divergence?” (2019) 
31 SAcLJ 170 at 179−187.
154 [2016] AC 742.
155 (1854) 9 Exch 341.
156 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623.
157 [2009] 1 AC 61.
158 [2011] 1 SLR 150. And see the comment by Goh Yihan, “Explaining Contractual 
Remoteness in Singapore” [2011] JBL 282. See further Senthil Sabapathy, “The 
Achilleas: Struggling to Stay Afloat” [2013] Sing JLS 384.
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confirmed by the same court in Out of the Box Pte Ltd v Wanin Industries 
Pte Ltd.159
88 The decision whether or not to follow what was, in substance, a sea 
change in the English law occurred recently in the sphere of contractual 
illegality. In particular, a majority160 of the UK Supreme Court had, in 
Patel v Mirza,161 adopted an entirely new approach towards contractual 
illegality (albeit only in relation to common law illegality) by adopting a 
“range of factors approach” whereas the minority adopted a rule-based 
approach. The former approach confers discretion on the court to decide 
whether or not to permit recovery notwithstanding an illegal contract 
159 [2013] 2 SLR 363.
160 Although Lord  Neuberger of Abbotsbury is considered to be in the majority, we 
would respectfully suggest that his views straddle both the majority and the minority 
views. However, reasons of space once again preclude a detailed discussion and 
the reader is referred to Andrew Phang, “The Intractable Problems of Illegality 
and Public Policy in the Law of Contract – A Comparative Perspective” in Essays 
in Memory of Jill Poole – Coherence, Modernisation and Integration in Contract, 
Commercial and Corporate Laws (Rob Merkin & James Devenney gen eds) (Informa 
Law, 2018) ch 12 at pp 208−212.
161 [2017] AC 467. This decision is obviously a seminal one in the English law and, not 
surprisingly, therefore, has been the subject of much academic commentary: see, 
eg, James Goudkamp, “The End of an Era? Illegality in Private Law in the Supreme 
Court” (2017) 133 LQR 14; James C Fisher, “The Latest Word on Illegality” [2016] 
LMCLQ 483; Nicholas Strauss, “The Diminishing Power of the Defendant: Illegality 
after Patel v Mirza” [2016] RLR 145; Emer Murphy, “The Ex Turpi Causa Defence 
in Claims against Professionals” (2016) 32  Professional Negligence 241; Andrew 
Burrows, “A New Dawn for the Law of Illegality” (2 June 2017) <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2979425> (accessed 5  June 2017) (see now Illegality after Patel v Mirza 
(Sarah Green & Alan Bogg gen eds) (Hart Publishing, 2018) ch 2); Lord Grabiner QC, 
Master of Clare College, “Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 – Illegality and Restitution 
Explained by the Supreme Court”, The Second Distinguished Law Lecture, Queen’s 
College, Cambridge (19  October 2016) <https://www.law.cam.ac.uk/press/
events/2016/10/queens-distinguished-lecture-law-patel-v-mirza-illegality-and-
restitution> (accessed 19 April 2017); Michael P Furmston, “Recent Developments 
in Illegal Contracts” in Essays in Memory of Jill Poole – Coherence, Modernisation 
and Integration in Contract, Commercial and Corporate Laws (Rob Merkin & James 
Devenney gen eds) (Informa Law, 2018) ch 11; and Graham Virgo, “The Illegality 
Revolution” in Revolution and Evolution in Private Law (Sarah Worthington, 
Andrew Robertson  &  Graham Virgo gen  eds) (Hart Publishing, 2018) as well as 
(by the same author), “Jones Day Professorship of Commercial Law Lecture 2019 – 
‘The State of Illegality’” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 747. Indeed, Goudkamp went so far as to 
observe that “Patel v Mirza … is a pivotal moment in English private law”: James 
Goudkamp, “The End of an Era? Illegality in Private Law in the Supreme Court” 
(2017) 133 LQR 14 at 14. See also the very recent collection of essays in Illegality 
after Patel v Mirza (Sarah Green & Alan Bogg gen eds) (Hart Publishing, 2018) as 
well as Andrew Phang, “The Intractable Problems of Illegality and Public Policy in 
the Law of Contract – A Comparative Perspective” in Essays in Memory of Jill Poole – 
Coherence, Modernisation and Integration in Contract, Commercial and Corporate 
Laws (Rob Merkin & James Devenney gen eds) (Informa Law, 2018) ch 12.
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whilst the latter approach does not permit recovery pursuant to the 
illegal contract, but may permit recovery under established exceptions. It 
suffices for the purposes of the present article to note that the Singapore 
position is quite different. The latest decision is that of the Singapore Court 
of Appeal in Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui162 (“Ochroid Trading”). 
This particular decision in fact affirmed the principles laid down in the 
court’s earlier decision in Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo163 (“Ting Siew 
May”). The court in Ochroid Trading summarised the law relating to 
illegality and public policy as follows:164
64 The court will first ascertain whether the contract is prohibited 
either pursuant to a statute (expressly or impliedly) and/or an established head 
of common law public policy. This is the first stage of the inquiry and, if the 
contract is indeed thus prohibited, there can be no recovery pursuant to the 
(illegal) contract. This is subject to the caveat that, in the general common law 
category of contracts which are not unlawful per se but entered into with the 
object of committing an illegal act (and only in this category), the proportionality 
principle laid down in Ting Siew May ought to be applied to determine if the 
contract is enforceable.
65 However, that may not be the end to the matter as a party who has 
transferred benefits pursuant to the illegal contract might be able to recover 
those benefits on a restitutionary basis (as opposed to recovery of full contractual 
damages). This is the second stage of the inquiry. We saw that there were at 
least three possible legal avenues for such recovery – all of which have been 
summarised above (at [43]−[60]).
66 The present legal position in Singapore is thus relatively clear  – at 
least in so far as the legal approach is concerned. Admittedly, the process of 
application of the relevant legal principles may be problematic but that is an 
inevitable part of adjudication and is common to all areas of the law. Having 
said that, and as alluded to above, there are issues which still need to be 
clarified, particularly the principles governing an independent claim in unjust 
enrichment for the recovery of benefits conferred under an illegal contract as 
well as the limits of such a claim.
[emphasis in original]
89 As can be seen, the court in Ochroid Trading did not follow the 
approach of the majority in Patel v Mirza. It held that the “range of factors” 
test adopted by the majority in Patel v Mirza was not part of Singapore 
law, and the law on the question of whether the contract concerned was 
prohibited – which arose at the first stage of the inquiry  – remained 
162 [2018] 1  SLR 363. See also Alexander Loke, “Disagreement over the Illegality 
Defence” (2018) 35  JCL 169 and Graham Virgo, “Jones Day Professorship of 
Commercial Law Lecture 2019 – ‘The State of Illegality’” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 747.
163 [2014] 3 SLR 609.
164 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [64]−[66].
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unchanged.165 In arriving at this holding, the court was of the view that 
the approach of the majority in Patel v Mirza would introduce further 
uncertainty into the analytical process by superimposing an additional 
inquiry based on the “range of factors” test across the board to all situations 
of common law illegality. Such an approach was undesirable as it created 
an unprincipled distinction between the principles which applied to 
statutory illegality and those which governed common law illegality 
(the court in Patel v Mirza having laid down the “range of factors” test 
for situations of common law illegality only). The “range of factors” test 
was also unnecessary to achieve remedial justice in the Singapore context 
given the flexibility of the principles laid down in Ting Siew May, which 
would also allow restitutionary recovery at the second stage166 of the 
inquiry.167 However, the court in Ochroid Trading did go further inasmuch 
as it proceeded to hold that even where the restitutionary recovery of 
benefits conferred under an illegal contract would, in principle, also be 
available where the ordinary requirements of an independent claim in 
unjust enrichment were satisfied, a (separate) defence of illegality and 
public policy in unjust enrichment might nevertheless bar such recovery 
where the principle of stultification (taking reference from a seminal 
article by Peter Birks),168 which principle requires the court to determine 
whether allowing the claim would undermine the fundamental policy 
that rendered the underlying contract void and unenforceable in the 
first place.169 In each case, the court must carefully examine the relevant 
considerations and the policy, be it statutory or the common law, which 
rendered the contract illegal before considering if that same policy 
would be undermined or stultified if the claim in unjust enrichment was 
allowed.170
90 It should be further noted that divergences were not only 
from English law. In the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of PH 
Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hongkong) Ltd,171 it was held 
that there ought to be a general rule (indeed, save in the most egregious 
breaches of contract) that punitive damages cannot be awarded for 
165 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1  SLR 363 at [64], reproduced 
immediately above.
166 See Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [65], reproduced above.
167 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [125].
168 See Peter Birks, “Recovering Value Transferred under an Illegal Contract” (2000) 
1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 155.
169 See Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [143], [145]−[148], 
[158] and [159]. And on observations on other independent causes of action and the 
scope of the concept of stultification, see [161]−[168].
170 The court in Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [128], [129] 
and [139] also clarified the different senses of “reliance” in relation to restitutionary 
recovery.
171 [2017] 2 SLR 129.
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breach of contract. In arriving at this holding, the court considered the 
arguments both for as well as against the award of such damages and 
held that it would not follow the Supreme Court of Canada decision of 
Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co.172
91 And in the recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision of BOM v 
BOK,173 the court held that the broader doctrine of unconscionability 
embodied in the High Court of Australia decision of Commercial Bank 
of Australia Ltd v Amadio174 was not part of Singapore law and endorsed, 
instead, a narrow doctrine of unconscionability.175
92 Both Singapore decisions referred to briefly in the preceding two 
paragraphs demonstrate not only the comparative approach adopted by 
the Singapore courts towards the development of Singapore law but also 
the fact that decisions from other jurisdictions will nevertheless not be 
adopted automatically.
93 That having been said, there have been rare occasions when the 
Singapore courts have developed a uniquely local set of jurisprudence 
and principles. This is particularly evident in the law relating to discharge 
by breach of contract, which is an area of the law of contract that is in a 
state of flux in the Commonwealth – in the main, because the two tests 
which can be employed in ascertaining whether or not the innocent party 
can elect to treat itself as discharged from the contract as a result of a 
breach by the other party of one or more of the terms of the contract 
concerned are not only quite different but could also (depending on the 
precise facts and circumstances of a particular case) give rise to different 
results.176 Indeed, as the first- and second-named authors sought to 
demonstrate in a joint essay, there are historical reasons that resulted in 
two conceptually different approaches as embodied in the two tests just 
mentioned.177 The Singapore Court of Appeal, in RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v 
172 (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 257. Reference may also be made to Andrew Phang & Goh 
Yihan, “Contract Law in Commonwealth Countries: Uniformity or Divergence?” 
(2019) 31 SAcLJ 170 at 231−235.
173 [2019] 1 SLR 349.
174 (1983) 151 CLR 447.
175 See further Andrew Phang  &  Goh Yihan, “Contract Law in Commonwealth 
Countries: Uniformity or Divergence?” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 170 at 216−231.
176 These are, respectively, the “condition-warranty approach” (as elaborated upon the 
oft-cited English Court of Appeal decision of Bentsen v Taylor, Sons & Co [1893] 
2 QB 274 at 281, per Bowen LJ (as he then was)) and the “Hongkong Fir approach” 
(which draws its terminology from the leading English Court of Appeal decision of 
Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 at 66, 
per Diplock LJ (as he then was)).
177 See Andrew Phang & Goh Yihan, “Encounters with History, Theory and Doctrine: 
Some Reflections on Discharge by Breach of Contract” in Contract in Commercial 
(cont’d on the next page)
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Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd,178 sought to formulate an approach that would, 
as far as is possible, integrate both the aforementioned tests. A summary 
of the legal position is to be found in diagrammatic form in that case179 
and in non-diagrammatic form in the subsequent (also) Singapore Court 
of Appeal decision in Man Financial (S)  Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan 
David.180 Although this is an important area of contract law, owing to 
the constraints of space in the context of the present article, the reader is 
referred to the relevant legal literature.181
(iii) Law of intellectual property
94 Whilst we have spent some time and space on developments in 
the two main areas in the general law of obligations, we note that there 
have been significant developments in other areas of Singapore law as 
well. One of these areas concerns intellectual property law. Indeed, the 
local development of the law in this area has been so substantial that 
a casebook on Singapore intellectual property law was recently published.182 
Not surprisingly, several very significant judgments have been handed 
down by the Singapore Court of Appeal in recent years. It will not be 
possible to even list all of them and therefore a briefest of samples will 
have to suffice.
95 The first is Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood 
Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc183 (“Staywell”), an important Singapore 
decision in trademark law. It covered many issues – including the 
issue relating to the assessment of the similarity of marks184 (which the 
Singapore Court of Appeal held should be done mark-for-mark without 
Law (Simone Degeling, James Edelman & James Goudkamp gen  eds) (Thomson 
Reuters, 2016) ch 12.
178 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413.
179 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 at [113].
180 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663 at [153]−[158].
181 See, in particular, Andrew Phang & Goh Yihan, “Encounters with History, Theory 
and Doctrine: Some Reflections on Discharge by Breach of Contract” in Contract in 
Commercial Law (Simone Degeling, James Edelman & James Goudkamp gen eds) 
(Thomson Reuters, 2016) ch 12 – as well as the legal literature cited therein. Reference 
may also be made to Andrew Phang & Goh Yihan, “Contract Law in Commonwealth 
Countries: Uniformity or Divergence?” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 170 at 205−216.
182 See David Llewellyn, Ng Hui Ming & Nicole Oh Xuan Yuan, Cases, Materials and 
Commentary on Singapore Intellectual Property Law (Academy Publishing, 2018). In 
so far as textbooks are concerned, see generally Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Law of Intellectual 
Property of Singapore (Sweet  &  Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, 2nd  Ed, 2014) and 
Susanna H S Leong, Intellectual Property Law of Singapore (Academy Publishing, 
2013).
183 [2014] 1 SLR 911.
184 Pursuant to s 8(2) of the Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed), which principles 
are also applicable in the context of s 27(2) of the same Act.
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consideration of external matter). The step-by-step approach differed 
from the global appreciation approach adopted in both the UK and 
European Union (as the latter did permit external matter to be taken 
into account). The court was also of the view that the three aspects of 
similarity (viz, visual, aural and conceptual similarity) were not to be 
the subject of formulaic consideration but were, instead, to be applied as 
signposts towards answering the question as to whether or not the marks 
concerned as a whole were similar.
96 In so far as the issue as to whether or not there had been confusion, 
the court in Staywell pointed out that there was a difference between the 
approach to the confusion inquiry in opposition proceedings and in 
infringement proceedings. In the former, the court would have regard 
to the full range of actual and notional uses of the marks concerned, 
whereas in the latter, the court would compare the full range of notional 
fair uses of the incumbent mark against the actual use to which the 
allegedly infringing mark had been put.
97 What is of particularly notable significance with regard to Staywell 
is Lord Neuberger’s observation185 in the UK Supreme Court decision of 
Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc186 (“Starbucks”) 
that Staywell was “an impressively wide-ranging judgment”.187 That court 
was in fact concerned with the specific issue as to whether a foreign trader 
which does not conduct any business activity within the jurisdiction can 
maintain an action in passing off within that jurisdiction and referred 
to the views expressed in Staywell (which was prepared to recognise 
pre-trading activity which unequivocally evinced the trader’s intention 
to enter that market and which was sufficient to generate an attractive 
force that would bring in custom when the business in that jurisdiction 
eventually materialised). It was, however, unnecessary to decide whether 
to endorse the approach adopted in Staywell as it did not arise in Starbucks 
itself.188
98 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Petra Foods Ltd189 is an important 
Singapore Court of Appeal decision in relation to shape marks as well as 
the requirement of distinctiveness for trade mark protection. In this last-
mentioned regard, the court held that the applicant would have, in order 
to show that the mark concerned had acquired distinctiveness, to prove 
185 With whom Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson and Lord Hodge agreed.
186 [2015] 1 WLR 2628.
187 Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2015] 1 WLR 2628 at [45].
188 Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2015] 1 WLR 2628 at [45], 
[46] and (especially) [66]. See also the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of 
Singsung Pte Ltd v LG 26 Electronics Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 86 at [68].
189 [2017] 1 SLR 35.
  
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
that consumers had come to rely on the sign as a guarantee of origin and 
that it was insufficient to show that there was a tendency for consumers 
to associate the shape concerned with a particular trader because they 
had become familiar with that shape and had recognised it. The court 
also elaborated upon the test for ascertaining whether a shape mark 
was caught by the “technical result” prohibition in s 7(3)(b) of the Trade 
Marks Act, which test comprised two stages.190
99 And, in the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Warner-
Lambert Co  LLC v Novartis (Singapore) Pte Ltd,191 the court laid 
down important principles in relation to the amendment of patent 
specifications.192 In particular, the court held that s 84(3) of the Patents 
Act193 limited the court’s power to allow an amendment of a patent’s 
specification by precluding amendments which resulted in the disclosure 
of additional matter or the extension of the scope of protection conferred 
by the patent. The amendments sought had to also satisfy the baseline 
criteria set out in s 25(5) of that same Act. The court further held that the 
power to allow an amendment of patent specifications was a discretionary 
one such that even if the amendment did not disclose additional matter 
or extend the protection conferred by the patent, the court retained the 
general discretion to refuse an amendment application. In exercising 
its discretion, the court would take into account a number of factors.194 
The court also made some observations with regard to the protection of 
subsequent medical uses under the Patents Act. In particular, it observed 
that there is a broad public interest in providing incentives and patent 
protection over new therapeutic uses of known substances. This objective 
could be achieved through a wider and purposive interpretation of 
s 14(7) of the Patents Act. If so, then the court observed that there would 
be no need to resort to Swiss-style claims (which are claims to a process 
190 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Petra Foods Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 35 at [81]. The first 
stage involves identifying the essential characteristics of the shape mark concerned. 
The second stage entails determining whether each and every one of the essential 
characteristics performed a technical function.
191 [2017] 2 SLR 707.
192 For a recent (and important) decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in relation 
to the original jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court to hear applications for 
the revocation of a patent, see Sunseap Group Pte Ltd v Sun Electric Pte Ltd [2019] 
1 SLR 645.
193 Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed.
194 These were (a)  whether the patentee had disclosed all the relevant information 
with regard to the amendments; (b)  whether the amendments were permitted in 
accordance with the statutory requirements; (c)  whether the patentee delayed in 
seeking the amendments (and, if so, whether there were reasonable grounds for such 
delay); (d) whether the patentee had sought to obtain an unfair advantage from the 
patent; and (e) whether the conduct of the patentee discouraged the amendment of 
the patent.
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of manufacture of a medicament for the purpose of the new therapeutic 
use of the known compound) – although the court also pointed out that 
it saw no reason to disagree with the validity of such claims at this stage.
100 The third significant branch of intellectual property law (relating 
to copyright) has also witnessed important developments. One such 
development may be found in the Singapore Court of Appeal decision 
of Global Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd.195 This is an 
important decision that deals with the copyright status of online (in that 
case, telephone) directories. Whilst the basic principle that for copyright 
to subsist in a literary work, there had to be authorial creation that was 
causally connected with the engagement of the human intellect is clear, 
this decision illustrates the difficulties that lie in the application of that 
principle; from a legal standpoint, the significance of this decision is that 
it expressed a preference for the “creativity” approach over the “sweat 
of the brow” approach in so far as the aforementioned basic principle 
was concerned. The decision also dealt with the issue of fair dealing. The 
entire decision repays close reading. Indeed, the headnote alone is seven 
printed pages long and contains 19 holdings.
(iv) Law of real property
101 Turning now to the sphere of land law,196 the case which probably 
has had the most significant international impact is that of the Singapore 
Court of Appeal in Xpress Print Pte Ltd v Monocrafts Pte Ltd197 (“Xpress 
Print”), where the court (having regard to both principle and logic as well 
as the specific local circumstances of Singapore) differed from English 
law (which had extended an immediate right of support to land only in 
its natural state (and a right of support of a building only, if at all, after a 
20-year gestation period)). Yong Pung How CJ, delivering the judgment 
of the court, observed thus:198
[W]e are of the view that the proposition that a landowner may excavate his 
land with impunity, sending his neighbour’s building and everything in it 
crashing to the ground, is a proposition inimical to a society which respects 
each citizen’s property rights, and we cannot assent to it. No doubt the trial 
judge felt constrained by [the various authorities, including the leading English 
case[199] which has been rejected], but this court is entitled to depart from those 
195 [2017] 2 SLR 185.
196 See generally Tang Hang Wu & Kelvin F K Low, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore 
Land Law (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2019). See also Melissa Mak, “Land Law: Establishing 
Principles in Discrete Aspects” in Singapore Law – 50  Years in the Making (Goh 
Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 13.
197 [2000] 2 SLR(R) 614.
198 Xpress Print Pte Ltd v Monocrafts Pte Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 614 at [37].
199 Viz, Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740.
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cases, and therefore does not suffer from any such impediment. In the event, we 
are of the opinion that the current state of affairs cannot be allowed to persist.
102 This decision has been described as “justice at its intellectual 
and practical best – dealing with unique local circumstances in modern 
context, yet simultaneously possessing a substantive applicability beyond 
the shores of Singapore”.200 Indeed, in this last-mentioned regard, one 
the leading English textbooks on land law has, in fact, devoted an entire 
paragraph to Xpress Print.201 We pause to note at this juncture that there 
are in fact a number of extremely significant decisions on Singapore land 
law. However, as they centre in the main on distinctly local statutory 
provisions, they may not have had as wide ranging an impact on the 
international scene.202 Indeed, this is probably a fortiori the case in 
relation to criminal law and procedure,203 evidence law204 as well as public 
law.
(v) Law of equity and trusts
103 In the law of equity and trusts, one significant issue decided by 
the Singapore courts concerns whether an institutional constructive 
trust would arise over bribes received by a fiduciary in breach of his duty.205 
200 See Andrew Phang  &  V  K  Rajah, “The Legal Legacy of Chief Justice Yong Pung 
How” Inter Se Commemorative Issue 2005, pp 10−13 at p 11.
201 A point noted by Andrew Phang & V K Rajah, “The Legal Legacy of Chief Justice 
Yong Pung How” Inter Se Commemorative Issue (May–June 2006) at p  11 (citing 
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, 
4th Ed, 2005) at para 1.63; see now Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of 
Land Law (Oxford University Press, 5th Ed, 2009) at para 1.2.30 (the decision is also 
referred to at paras 1.2.26, 1.2.29, 1.5.57 and 3.3.25)). See also Tang Hang Wu, “The 
Right of Lateral Support of Buildings from the Adjoining Land” [2002] Conv 237.
202 See, once again, the illuminating essay by Melissa Mak, “Land Law: Establishing 
Principles in Discrete Aspects” in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making 
(Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 13 which sets out 
the impact of significant Singapore decisions in the local context. Perhaps the same 
may be said of family law (see also n 120 above).
203 See also n 119 above. Though cf Mohamed Faizal Mohamed Abdul Kadir, “Criminal 
Law: It’s a Not-So-Autochthonous-World After All? – Striking the Right Balance 
between Local Circumstances and Increasingly-Convergent International Norms” 
in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015) ch 8.
204 See also Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 2017); 
Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell/
Thomson Reuters, 2nd Ed, 2018); as well as Chen Siyuan, “Evidence and Criminal 
Procedure: Gradual Developments towards Clarity in a Maze of Statutory 
Enactments” in Singapore Law – 50  Years in the Making (Goh  Yihan  &  Paul Tan 
gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 7.
205 See Alvin  W  L  See, Yip Man  &  Goh Yihan, Property and Trust Law: Singapore 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2018) at p 400, which also furnishes a general account of the law 
(cont’d on the next page)
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In this regard, the Singapore courts have consistently taken the view that 
such a constructive trust would arise. This is informed by the general 
attitude of Singapore law that a strongly deterrent approach is warranted 
in respect of breach of fiduciary duty.206 Thus, in the Singapore High 
Court case of Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Kartika Ratna Thahir207 (“Sumitomo 
Bank”), Lai Kew Chai J disagreed with the old English case of Lister & 
Co v Stubbs208 and rejected the view that a fiduciary who accepted bribes 
was not a constructive trustee and was only liable to account. Lai J held 
that a Singapore court exercising its equitable jurisdiction must reflect 
the mores and sense of justice of the society that it served; for that reason, 
he confined Lister & Co v Stubbs to its facts and declined to follow it.209 
In Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Charles Warwick Reid,210 the Privy 
Council, hearing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, 
held that it was “impressed” with the decision in Sumitomo Bank.211 
Drawing on the strength of Sumitomo Bank, amongst other authorities, 
the Privy Council likewise declined to follow Lister  &  Co v Stubbs. In 
this example, the Singapore case was probably only considered by the 
Privy Council because it presented a novel (yet principled) point of view, 
distinct from the prevailing English law. What was more noteworthy 
about this example is the fact that Sumitomo Bank was decided in 1992, 
before the passage of the AELA and at a time when Singapore law was 
probably more tied to English law than it is today.
104 Several years later, the English courts finally had occasion 
to decide this issue. In FHR  European Ventures  LLP v Cedar Capital 
Partners LLC212 (“FHR”), the UK Supreme Court held that a constructive 
trust arises over bribes and secret commissions received by fiduciary 
agents in breach of fiduciary duty. Notably, the FHR decision was arrived 
at by reason of Lord Neuberger’s change of his views as previously held in 
of equity and trusts in Singapore (reference in this latter regard may also be made 
to Yip Man, “Trusts and Equity: Dreaming and Building a Singapore Equitable 
Jurisdiction” in Singapore Law – 50  Years in the Making (Goh Yihan  &  Paul Tan 
gen  eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch  12). In this particular instance, see the 
decision of Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara 
(Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312.
206 See Yip Man  &  Goh Yihan, “Navigating the Maze: Making Sense of Equitable 
Compensation and Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2016) 
28 SAcLJ 884 at 890–892.
207 [1992] 3 SLR(R) 638.
208 (1890) 45 Ch D 1.
209 Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Kartika Ratna Thahir [1992] 3 SLR(R) 638 at [241]–[243].
210 [1993] 3 WLR 1143.
211 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Charles Warwick Reid [1993] 3 WLR 1143 at 1152. 
See also “Privy Council Adopts S’pore Judge’s Ruling on Corruption” The  Straits 
Times (18 November 1993) at p 3.
212 [2014] 3 WLR 535.
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Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd213 (“Sinclair 
Investments”). In Sinclair Investments, he laid down a controversial 
“two-category” test that required, in essence, some form of proprietary 
connection between the unauthorised benefits and the principal’s 
assets (or assets that should properly belong to the principal) to justify 
proprietary relief.214 The Sinclair Investments categories ruled out 
proprietary relief in cases involving bribes and secret commissions as 
these unauthorised benefits are usually paid by third parties to the errant 
fiduciaries.
105 Yet another issue that the Singapore courts have carved out 
a unique path in the law of equity and trusts concerns the common 
intention constructive trust. In Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun215 (“Chen 
Yuen Lan”), the Court of Appeal declined to follow the prevailing English 
approach as laid down by the majority in Stack v Dowden.216 Instead, it 
agreed with Lord Neuberger’s minority view in Stack v Dowden. The court 
observed that the English developments were necessitated by the “changing 
economic and social conditions in England”, which included rises in both 
property prices and the number of unmarried cohabitees.217 Further, the 
court thought that the diminished application of the presumption of 
advancement under English law was also a driver for the Stack v Dowden/
Jones v Kernott developments, as the retention of the resulting trust alone 
would only put more emphasis on direct contributions to purchase price 
which the English courts considered to be restrictive.218 The court also 
considered that there were good reasons for not introducing the Stack 
v Dowden framework into Singapore law.219 First, the Stack v Dowden 
analysis is productive of litigation because of the subjectivity and 
uncertainty inherent in the approach. The uncertainty would also lead to 
a risk of higher and disproportionate litigation costs. Second, the court 
pointed out that the domestic/commercial distinction, which determines 
213 [2011] 3 WLR 1153.
214 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] 3  WLR 1153 
at [88]. Essentially, a constructive trust would only arise over an asset received by 
a fiduciary in breach of fiduciary duty where the asset is or has been the beneficial 
property of the beneficiary (category 1) or it was acquired by taking an advantage of 
an opportunity or a right that properly belonged the beneficiary (category 2). The 
decision received mixed reviews: see, eg, David Hayton, “Proprietary Liability for 
Secret Profits” (2011) 127  LQR 487; Roy Goode, “Proprietary Liability for Secret 
Profits: A Reply” (2011) 127 LQR 493; and Graham Virgo, “Profits Obtained in Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty: Personal and Proprietary Claim?” (2011) 70(3) Camb LJ 502.
215 [2014] 3 SLR 1048.
216 [2007] 2 AC 432.
217 Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [127].
218 Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [132].
219 Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [152].
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the applicable tool of analysis, would not be straightforward to apply in 
some disputes.
106 According to the Court of Appeal in Chan Yuen Lan, 
Lord  Neuberger’s approach220 would avoid the rigid domestic/
commercial classification. The court also agreed with Lord Neuberger’s 
rejection of judicial imputation of intentions at the stage of quantification 
of interests,221 as this would have the effect of preventing courts from 
employing the doctrine of common intentions constructive trust to 
achieve “palm tree” justice. Further, Lord Neuberger’s approach allows 
a consistent approach to be applied in both domestic and commercial 
contexts: the common intention constructive trust would apply in both 
instances to rebut the presumption of resulting trust. The court then 
proceeded to lay down a six-step analytical framework for determining 
property ownership222 where there have been unequal contributions to 
the purchase price:223
(a) Is there sufficient evidence of the parties’ respective financial 
contributions to the purchase price of the property? If the answer is ‘yes’, it 
will be presumed that the parties hold the beneficial interest in the property 
in proportion to their respective contributions to the purchase price (ie, the 
presumption of resulting trust arises). If the answer is ‘no’, it will be presumed 
that the parties hold the beneficial interest in the same manner as that in which 
the legal interest is held.
(b) Regardless of whether the answer to (a) is ‘yes’ or ‘no’, is there 
sufficient evidence of an express or an inferred common intention that the 
parties should hold the beneficial interest in the property in a proportion which 
is different from that set out in (a)? If the answer is ‘yes’, the parties will hold the 
beneficial interest in accordance with that common intention instead, and not 
in the manner set out in (a). In this regard, the court may not impute a common 
intention to the parties where one did not in fact exist.
(c) If the answer to both (a) and (b) is ‘no’, the parties will hold the 
beneficial interest in the property in the same manner as the manner in which 
they hold the legal interest.
(d) If the answer to (a) is ‘yes’ but the answer to (b) is ‘no’, is there 
nevertheless sufficient evidence that the party who paid a larger part of the 
purchase price of the property (‘X’) intended to benefit the other party (‘Y’) 
220 Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [153]–[158].
221 See also Chia Kum Fatt Rolfston v Lim Lay Choo [1993] 3  SLR 833 in which the 
Singapore High Court held that parties’ interests under a common intention 
constructive trust are commensurate with their financial contributions, rejecting 
non-financial contributions as being “difficult to quantify” – this could be read as 
rejecting an exercise of imputation of intention.
222 See statutory presumptions prescribed in s  53 of the Land Titles Act (Cap  157, 
2004 Rev Ed) concerning the manner of holding in the absence of express stipulation.
223 Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [160].
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with the entire amount which he or she paid? If the answer is ‘yes’, then X would 
be considered to have made a gift to Y of that larger sum and Y will be entitled 
to the entire beneficial interest in the property.
(e) If the answer to (d) is ‘no’, does the presumption of advancement 
nevertheless operate to rebut the presumption of resulting trust in (a)? If the 
answer is ‘yes’, then: (i) there will be no resulting trust on the facts where the 
property is registered in Y’s sole name (ie, Y will be entitled to the property 
absolutely); and (ii) the parties will hold the beneficial interest in the property 
jointly where the property is registered in their joint names. If the answer is ‘no’, 
the parties will hold the beneficial interest in the property in proportion to their 
respective contributions to the purchase price.
(f) Notwithstanding the situation at the time the property was acquired, 
is there sufficient and compelling evidence of a subsequent express or inferred 
common intention that the parties should hold the beneficial interest in a 
proportion which is different from that in which the beneficial interest was 
held at the time of acquisition of the property? If the answer is ‘yes’, the parties 
will hold the beneficial interest in accordance with the subsequent altered 
proportion. If the answer is ‘no’, the parties will hold the beneficial interest in 
one of the modes set out at (b)–(e) above, depending on which is applicable.
(vi) Public law
107 In so far, however, as public law is concerned, there is, necessarily, 
a universal or universalisable element in most of the decisions. Hence, for 
example, in the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Chng Suan Tze v 
Minister for Home Affairs,224 the following important observations were 
made by the court:225
In our view, the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the 
rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts 
should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power. If therefore the 
Executive in exercising its discretion under an Act of Parliament has exceeded 
the four corners which Parliament has decided it can exercise its discretion, 
such an exercise of discretion would be ultra vires the Act and a court of law 
must be able to hold it to be so. … It must be clear therefore that the boundaries 
of the decision maker’s jurisdiction as conferred by an Act of Parliament is a 
question solely for the courts to decide. … Further, it is … no answer to refer to 
accountability to Parliament as an alternative safeguard. … [emphasis added]
108 This principle set out in the preceding paragraph has been 
applied in many subsequent decisions226 and is perhaps the most 
important illustration inasmuch as it is a bedrock principle. One of 
those subsequent decisions is the important Singapore Court of Appeal 
224 [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525.
225 Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [86].
226 See, eg, Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [2].
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decision of Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General.227 In this case, the appellant 
was detained without trial pursuant to the Criminal Law (Temporary 
Provisions) Act228 (“CLTPA”) on 16 September 2013. Later, on 20 October 
2013, the Minister for Home Affairs served an order under the CLTPA to 
detain the appellant for a period of 12 months, which was then extended 
on 2 October 2014 for yet another year. The minister considered that the 
detention order was necessary by reason of the fact that the appellant 
was a threat to public peace, safety and good order. The minister stated, 
inter alia, that the appellant had directed match-fixing agents and runners 
from Singapore to assist in match-fixing between 2009 and 2013 and also 
financed match-fixing activities in other countries. The appellant applied 
for an order for review of detention, contending that his detention 
was illegal, irrational and procedurally improper. This application was 
dismissed by the High Court.
109 The Court of Appeal allowed the appellant’s appeal. The court 
began its judgment by stating unequivocally that the “rule of law is 
the bedrock on which our society was founded and on which it has 
thrived”.229 Indeed, the court explained that one of the core ideas behind 
the rule of law is that the power of the State as vested in the various arms 
of government is subject to legal limits.230 Based on the general premise, 
the court held that the scope of review would be limited to the traditional 
principles governing judicial review, namely, illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety. In addition, the court had the power to inquire 
into whether “high policy” decisions were made within the scope of the 
relevant legal power and arrived at in a legal manner. In this regard, there 
was therefore no question of deference to the Executive’s discretion in 
such an inquiry. Moreover, the question of the scope of power conferred 
on the Executive by the Legislature was one for the Judiciary.
110 Applying these principles, the court held that the CLTPA was 
originally enacted to deal with real and physical threats within Singapore. 
This was later expanded to cover a wider range of offences, but were 
underpinned by, among other things, the justification that the offences 
pertained to harm to public order within Singapore. In the present case, 
the court, in allowing the appeal, held that even though the CLTPA’s 
scope was extended to cover match-fixing syndicates, there nevertheless 
needed to be a connection between the activities undertaken by match-
fixing syndicates and the unifying characteristics underpinning the 
criminal activities before the minister could invoke the CLTPA to detain 
227 [2016] 1 SLR 779.
228 Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed.
229 Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [1].
230 Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [1].
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a person. Thus, while the detention order stated that the appellant led 
a match-fixing syndicate aimed at fixing matches in other countries, 
the order was not sufficiently clear on why those activities were serious 
enough to fall within the scope of the CLTPA. The significance of this 
case, above all, demonstrated the division of power across the three 
branches of government in Singapore, and the important responsibility 
the courts have in safeguarding the proper limits of any powers exercised 
by the other branches of government.
111 In so far as other areas of public law are concerned, it suffices 
for present purposes to refer the reader to a comprehensive treatise,231 
a recent collection of essays,232 as well as an excellent essay233 for balanced 
accounts as well as perceptive analyses in what is (by its very nature) 
a potentially controversial area of law.
(vii) Shipping law
112 The sphere of shipping law is another where Singapore decisions 
have had an international impact.234 Perhaps the most significant decision 
since the turn of the century is that of the Singapore Court of Appeal 
in APL Co Pte Ltd v Voss Peer,235 where (amidst a hitherto unclear legal 
position worldwide coupled with, not surprisingly, divided academic 
opinion as well) the court held that a carrier must only deliver cargo not 
only against a negotiable bill of lading but also (and this was the crucial 
legal point) with regard to a non-negotiable bill of lading as well (the latter 
being a bill of lading stating that goods are to be delivered to a named 
consignee and which is sometimes referred to as a straight bill of lading).
113 The court gave several related reasons for arriving at this 
conclusion (viz, that in respect of a straight bill of lading, the carrier could 
only deliver the cargo concerned against its presentation): first, that, the 
court, on the basis of contract law, should give effect to the intention of the 
parties; second, that requiring presentation of such a bill of lading before 
231 See Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Academy Publishing, 
2012).
232 See Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore: Theory and Practice (Jaclyn  L  Neo 
gen ed) (Routledge, 2017).
233 See Cheah Wui Ling, “Administrative and Constitutional Law – An Expository 
Approach to Public Law Adjudication: The Singapore Judiciary’s Evolving 
Jurisprudence” in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan 
gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 5.
234 See generally Tan Lee Meng, Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Academy Publishing, 
3rd Ed, 2018) and Toh Kian Sing, Admiralty Law and Practice (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2017).
235 [2002] 2 SLR(R) 1119. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this decision was also reported in 
Lloyd’s Law Reports (see [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 707).
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delivery promoted commercial certainty (and, correspondingly, avoided 
confusion) as carriers or their agents did not need to decide whether a 
bill of lading was a straight or an order (transferable) bill of lading; third, 
that to decide otherwise would result in an overly restrictive approach for 
an unpaid seller who wished to use a non-negotiable (that is, straight) bill 
of lading whilst retaining his security for payment; and, finally, requiring 
presentation of the straight bill of lading avoided the undesirable 
consequences of the shipper’s rights of suit under the original contract 
of carriage surviving any transfer of the document to the consignee.236 
As Steven Chong J (himself a leading shipping and commercial lawyer 
before joining the Singapore Bench) pertinently observed, this decision 
“has been celebrated by practitioners and commentators alike” and 
that “[i]mpressively, it has been picked up and applied in other leading 
common law jurisdictions”.237
(viii) Conflict of laws
114 There have been a number of significant decisions in the conflict 
of laws, particularly over the last decade or so.238 One of the most recent 
is that of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd239 (“Vinmar”). This case is of 
special significance as it marks one of the rare occasions when the Court 
of Appeal has departed from one of its previous decisions. It concerned the 
situation where there was an application for a stay of proceedings based 
on an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The court held that the overarching 
236 See generally APL Co Pte Ltd v Voss Peer [2002] 2 SLR(R) 1119 at [50], [51], [52] and 
[54].
237 See Steven Chong, “A Maritime Journey” in A Judge for the Ages – Essays in Honour of 
Justice Chao Hick Tin (Andrew Phang Boon Leong & Goh Yihan gen eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2017) at p 498. The learned author refers, in particular, to the reliance on 
this particular decision by both the English Court of Appeal as well as the House of 
Lords in JI MacWilliams Co Inc v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA [2004] 2 WLR 283 
(CA); [2005] 2 AC 423 (HL). He also points out (at p 499) that the decision:
… was cited positively by [the] Federal Court of Australia [in Beluga Shipping 
GmbH & Co v Headway Shipping Ltd [2008] FCA 1791 at [16]], all three levels 
of the Hong Kong courts, including the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 
[in  Carewins Development (China) Ltd v Bright Fortune Shipping Ltd [2006] 
4  HKC 1 (Hong Kong Court of First Instance) at [93]; [2007] 4  HKC 239 
(Hong Kong Court of Appeal) at [53]; [2009] 5 HKC 160 (Hong Kong Court of 
Final Appeal) at [38]], and by the Federal Court of British Columbia [in Asian 
Exports International Ltd v Zim Israel [2004] FCJ No 264].
238 See, eg, Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 
(in relation to the doctrine of forum non conveniens as well as the choice of law 
rules governing equitable and tortious claims). See also Nicholas Poon, “Conflict of 
Laws” in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) 
(Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 15.
239 [2018] 2 SLR 1271.
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test remained that of whether there is “strong cause” to refuse a stay. In 
determining whether this test is satisfied, the factors laid down in the 
English decision in The Eleftheria240 are relevant considerations, although 
in applying those factors, the court should bear in mind that factors 
relating to the relative convenience of litigation in Singapore and abroad 
have little weight if they were foreseeable at the time of contracting.
115 However, the court held – departing from a hitherto established 
line of cases that could be traced to its previous decision in The Jian 
He241 – that the time had come to rule that in determining whether to 
grant a stay in an exclusive jurisdiction clause application, the merits 
of the defence were irrelevant. Indeed, it observed that the rule in The 
Jian He was inconsistent with the central principle of party autonomy 
that pervades the law in this field and also generated uncertainty for 
commercial parties in the business of international trade. Parties under 
that rule were also led to expend significant costs at the interlocutory 
stage of proceedings and this had delayed the resolution of disputes. The 
court also held that abandoning the rule in The Jian He would promote 
coherence in the law by aligning the law governing exclusive jurisdiction 
clause applications with the position in forum non conveniens and 
International Arbitration Act242 applications, where the merits of the 
defence are irrelevant to whether a stay should be granted. Consistency 
would also be achieved in so far as the treatment of exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements are concerned. In addition to the aforementioned reasons 
rooted in principle, policy and coherence, the court in Vinmar also 
pointed out that the doctrinal basis upon which the merits of the defence 
were incorporated into the framework in The Eleftheria (and which was 
embodied in The Jian He line of cases) was flawed.
(ix) Arbitration law
116 There have in fact been a great many significant decisions in 
arbitration law.243 This is not surprising in view of the fact that Singapore 
240 [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 237.
241 [1999] 3 SLR(R) 432.
242 Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed.
243 See generally Leslie K H Chew, Introduction to the Law and Practice of Arbitration in 
Singapore (LexisNexis, 2010); Singapore International Arbitration: Law and Practice 
(David Joseph & David Foxton gen eds) (LexisNexis, 2014); Robert Merkin & Johanna 
Hjalmarsson, Singapore Arbitration Legislation: Annotated (Informa Law, 2nd  Ed, 
2016); as well as Michael Hwang, Selected Essays on International Arbitration 
(Academy Publishing, 2013) and (by the same author) Selected Essays on Dispute 
Resolution (Academy Publishing, 2018). Reference may also be made to Darius 
Chan & Paul Tan, “International Arbitration: Internationalist Outlook Leading the 
Development of Local Jurisprudence” in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making 
(Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) ch 14.
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is a major arbitration centre. Constraints of space preclude an extensive 
discussion and the reader is referred to a recent article which gives 
a  comprehensive account of recent developments in this area.244 Just 
a couple of examples will have to suffice for present purposes although 
they do not do justice at all to the richly textured Singapore case law in 
this area that has emerged during recent times.
117 One significant issue is the standard of review that is applicable 
when the court is hearing an application for a stay of court proceedings in 
favour of arbitration pursuant to s 6 of the International Arbitration Act. 
The Singapore High Court decision of Malini Ventura v Knight Capital 
Pte Ltd245 did not follow the English position and had held, instead, 
that it was only necessary for the court concerned to be satisfied on a 
prima facie basis that there was a valid arbitration agreement in order 
for s 6 of the International Arbitration Act to be engaged (instead of 
the English position which required that the court be satisfied on the 
usual civil standard of a balance of probabilities that an arbitration 
agreement existed). This holding was later endorsed by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd v Silica Investors Ltd246 
(“Tomolugen Holdings”), where the court affirmed a prima facie standard 
of review, holding that the court concerned should grant a stay in favour 
of arbitration pursuant to s 6 of the International Arbitration Act if the 
applicant was able to establish a prima facie case that: (a) there was a valid 
arbitration clause between the parties to the court proceedings; (b) the 
dispute in the court proceedings (or any part thereof) fell within the 
scope of the arbitration clause; and (c) the arbitration clause was not null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The court in this 
case also considered the issue of a non-arbitrable subject matter, which 
it held would fall within one or more of the three exceptions in s 6(2) of 
the International Arbitration Act which (in turn) permitted a court to 
refuse a stay of court proceedings in favour of arbitration. The court then 
proceeded to hold that the essential criterion of non-arbitrability under 
s 11 of the International Arbitration Act was whether the subject matter 
of the dispute was of such a nature as to make it contrary to public policy 
for that dispute to be resolved by arbitration. In this regard, there was a 
presumption of arbitrability so long as a dispute fell within the scope of 
an arbitration clause. Such a presumption could, however, be rebutted 
244 See generally Justice Judith Prakash, “Recent Developments in Singapore 
Arbitration Law” (forthcoming in [2020] JMJ) and the decisions discussed therein. 
Reference may also be made to the recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision of 
Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 
1 SLR 732 (in relation to the grant of anti-suit injunctions and the power to grant 
declaratory relief).
245 [2015] 5 SLR 707.
246 [2016] 1 SLR 373.
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by showing that (a)  Parliament intended to preclude a particular type 
of dispute from being arbitrated (as evidenced by either the text or the 
legislative history of the statute concerned); or (b) it would be contrary 
to the public policy considerations involved in that type of dispute to 
permit it to be resolved by arbitration. In Tomolugen Holdings itself, the 
court held that a dispute over minority oppression or unfair prejudice 
was arbitrable.
118 Another significant issue – especially from the practical 
perspective – relates to the court’s power to grant assistance to arbitration 
proceedings in general and it power to grant interim measures (in 
particular, injunctions) pursuant to s 12A of the International Arbitration 
Act and under s 31 of the Arbitration Act.247 There are, in fact, a number 
of important Singapore decisions. However, perhaps the most significant 
one in recent times is the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of 
Bi Xiaoqiong v China Medical Technologies, Inc.248 The central issue that 
arose in this particular case was whether the court had the power to grant 
a Mareva injunction against a defendant to Singapore proceedings where, 
at the time the injunction was sought, the plaintiff intended to pursue 
foreign proceedings against the defendant so that there was a possibility 
that it would be the foreign proceedings, rather than the Singapore 
proceedings, that terminated in a judgment. The court held that provided 
the court otherwise had the power to grant a Mareva injunction against 
the particular defendant, the plaintiff ’s intention to pursue foreign 
proceedings could not negate such a power. This particular decision is 
an extremely important one as it finally decided which of two hitherto 
conflicting streams of Singapore cases ought to be followed.
119 In elaborating upon its holding, the court was, inter alia, of 
the view that the broad language used in s 4(10) of the Civil Law Act249 
conferred on the court a wide power to grant mandatory orders or 
injunctions. The only express requirements imposed by the language of 
s 4(10) of that Act were that the injunction had to be of an “interlocutory” 
nature, and that it could be made only in “cases in which it appears to 
the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made”. As 
a starting point at least, s  4(10) of the Civil Law Act appeared to be 
broad enough to encompass Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign court 
proceedings (and indeed any injunction of an interlocutory nature). 
Further, the word “injunction” as used in s 4(10) of the Civil Law Act did 
not exclude injunctions in aid of foreign court proceedings. The ordinary 
meaning of “injunction” did not naturally carry such a specific exclusion. 
247 Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed.
248 [2019] 2 SLR 595.
249 Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed.
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Although there were many different types of injunctions, they could all 
be described as being a court order commanding or preventing an action. 
There was nothing inherent in the meaning of “injunction” that required 
it to be made for the purpose of supporting local proceedings only. The 
purpose for which an injunction was obtained was not ordinarily an 
element in the definition or meaning of “injunction”.
120 However, the court’s power, though broad, was subject to at least 
two conditions. The first was that the court had in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendant, and the second was that the plaintiff had a reasonable 
accrued cause of action against the defendant in Singapore. Both these 
requirements were satisfied on the present facts. There was no further 
requirement that the cause of action against the defendant had to 
terminate in a judgment rendered by the court that issued the injunction.
121 The court held that the concept of the court retaining a residual 
jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action was a sound juridical 
basis on which to ground the court’s power to grant a Mareva injunction 
even where a stay of that action was sought. It followed from this 
rationale that there ought not to be a further requirement that the cause 
of action in respect of which the Mareva injunction was granted had to 
also terminate in a judgment by the court. An order by the court to stay 
an action or proceedings before it was simply an order given by the court 
to indicate that the proceedings would be halted for the time being. The 
Mareva injunction was but a species of interlocutory injunction, and the 
court’s jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctions was ancillary to 
the court’s jurisdiction over the proceedings before it. When an action 
was stayed, the court retained its ancillary jurisdiction over the action. 
It therefore followed that the court had to retain its jurisdiction to grant 
a Mareva injunction.
122 The court further held that the fact that a Mareva injunction 
was expressed to be “in aid of foreign court proceedings” was simply 
terminology and did not have implications for its juridical basis. The 
terminology acknowledged the reality that the plaintiff who obtained 
such a Mareva injunction intended to employ that Mareva injunction 
to aid in foreign court proceedings. As far as the juridical basis of such 
a Mareva injunction was concerned, however, it was still premised on, and 
in support of, proceedings in Singapore. A party’s intentions could not 
have any bearing whatsoever on the extent of the court’s powers. Further, 
a Mareva injunction would not cease to be treated as an interlocutory 
injunction just because there was a possibility that it might not terminate 
in a final judgment in Singapore. The Mareva injunction was inherently 
an interlocutory injunction, and its character was not altered by whether 
final judgment was or was not obtained here. Its interlocutory nature was 
derived from the fact that it was sought not as the main or substantive 
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claim in and of itself, but only as ancillary relief to a separate substantive 
claim. The respondents’ substantive claims against the appellant appeared 
by endorsement on the writ served on her. Their application for a Mareva 
injunction was made in support of these claims and, therefore, was 
unarguably for interlocutory relief.
123 Yet another area that the Singapore courts have charted a new 
part in this area of law relates to state investment treaties. In Sanum 
Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,250 
the Singapore Court of Appeal allowed a Macanese investor to proceed 
with expropriation claims against the Lao government under a 1993 
People’s Republic of China–Laos bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”). The 
court upheld the arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction and found 
that the BIT applied to Macau even though Macau was not under Chinese 
sovereign control when the treaty was entered into.
124 The facts of the case are complex but may be summarised as 
follows. Sanum Investments Ltd (“Sanum”), a Macanese investor, started 
to invest in the gaming and hospitality industry in Laos through a Laotian 
joint venture entity. Later, due to disputes between the Lao government 
and Sanum, Sanum began arbitration proceedings against the former 
in 2012 pursuant to Art 8(3) of the BIT. This article provides that “if a 
dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot 
be settled through negotiation within six months”, the dispute “may be 
submitted at the request of either party to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal”. 
This BIT had entered into force from 1 June 1993. However, the BIT was 
silent on whether it applied to Macau. This posed a potential problem 
because Macau was under the administrative control and sovereignty of 
Portugal in 1993. It was only after 1999 that China resumed sovereignty 
over Macau and established it as a Special Administrative Region.
125 As such, the Lao government raised two jurisdictional objections 
before the arbitral tribunal, which designated Singapore as the seat of 
arbitration: first, that the BIT did not apply to Macau; and, secondly, that 
Sanum’s claim was not arbitrable as it fell beyond the permitted subject 
matter under Art 8(3). The tribunal found it had jurisdiction to hear 
Sanum’s claim and rejected the two objections outlined above. The Lao 
government then appealed to the Singapore High Court under s 10(3) 
of the International Arbitration Act. In the result, the court held that 
the tribunal had no jurisdiction. Crucially, the court had depended on 
two diplomatic communications, both of which post-dated the tribunal’s 
award. These two communications showed that both China and Laos 
250 [2016] 5 SLR 536.
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considered that the BIT did not apply to Macau. Sanum then appealed 
against this decision to the Singapore Court of Appeal.
126 The Court of Appeal held that the BIT applied to Macau and that 
Sanum’s claim fell within Art 8(3). The court held that the moving treaty 
frontier rule under Art 15 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in respect of Treaties251 read with Art 29 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties252 establishes a customary international law 
that presumptively provides for the automatic extension of a treaty to 
a territory as and when it becomes part of the state. Further, the “critical 
date” doctrine excludes evidence that is generated past a certain critical 
date beyond which the parties’ actions cannot impact the dispute.
127 The Court of Appeal held specifically that the High Court 
should not have considered the relevant diplomatic communications 
because the critical date had set in on 14 August 2012, the date on which 
Sanum commenced the arbitration. What the parties did after that date 
should not affect the present dispute as a matter of admissibility or at 
least be attributed little, if any, weight. The reason for this was to avoid or 
de-emphasise evidence that was self-serving and intended by the party 
putting it forward to improve its position in the arbitration. Although 
states may choose to depart from customary international law prior to 
entering a treaty, the court did not find evidence of such an intention prior 
to the conclusion of the BIT. Thus, the court found, on a combination of 
the Moving Treaty Frontier Rule, as well as the “critical date” doctrine, 
that the tribunal did indeed have jurisdiction. It then applied a purposive 
interpretation to Art 8(3) and held that Sanum’s claim fell within the 
prescribed subject matter.
128 Yet another important Singapore Court of Appeal decision in 
this area is that in Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of 
Lesotho.253 This decision is significant because it marks the first time the 
Singapore courts have set aside a final award in an investment arbitration. 
The award concerned was a partial award on jurisdiction and merits 
issued on 18 April 2016 by a tribunal appointed by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (“PCA”) seated in Singapore. The tribunal, by a majority, 
found that the Kingdom of Lesotho (“the Kingdom”) had breached its 
obligations under the Protocol on Finance and Investment on the Southern 
African Development Community254 and Treaty of Southern African 
251 1946 UNTS 3 (23 August 1978; entry into force 6 November 1996).
252 1155 UNTS 331 (23 May 1969; entry into force 27 January 1980).
253 [2019] 1 SLR 263.
254 18 August 2006; entry into force 16 April 2010.
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Development Community255 (“SADC Treaty”) by voting improperly with 
other African nations to dissolve the SADC tribunal. This latter fact is 
important because the investors had commenced an expropriation claim 
before the SADC tribunal on the basis that the Kingdom had expropriated 
their rights under several mining leases. However, with that tribunal 
dissolved by the above-mentioned vote, the investors were deprived of a 
forum against the Kingdom. As such, a majority of the tribunal held that 
the Kingdom was in breach of its obligations to them under the SADC 
Treaty.
129 On 20 October 2016, the PCA tribunal issued a final award, 
finding that the Kingdom was to pay costs of the proceedings. The 
Kingdom thereafter started proceedings to set aside the award. The 
Singapore High Court set aside the entire award because it held that the 
PCA tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to hear the investment treaty 
claim. The Singapore Court of Appeal upheld this decision. It held that 
the court had the jurisdiction to hear the application to set aside the said 
award pursuant to Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration,256 which provided that an award 
could be set aside if it “deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration”.257 The remained 
the case even if the Kingdom was contesting the very existing of the PCA 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim referred to it.
130 The Singapore Court of Appeal further held that in order to 
qualify as an investment for the purposes of an investment treaty claim, 
an asset must qualify as an “investment” as defined by the relevant 
investment treaty and also have a territorial connection with the host 
state.258 In this regard, although (contrary to what the Singapore High 
Court had found) it found that there was an “investment” in the form of 
the mining leases, the Court of Appeal nevertheless found that investors 
could only be protected in relation to investments that were made within 
the host state because states in general did not have extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and thus could not protect rights outside of their borders259 – 
and that, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, 
255 32 ILM 116 (17 August 1992; entry into force 30 September 1993).
256 UN Doc A/40/17, annex I; UN Doc A/61/17, annex I (21 June 1985; amended 7 July 
2006).
257 Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of Lesotho [2019] 1 SLR 263 
at [80].
258 Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of Lesotho [2019] 1 SLR 263 at [98] 
and [99].
259 Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of Lesotho [2019] 1 SLR 263 
at [102].
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this requirement had not been satisfied.260 Moreover, the SDAC treaty 
provided for a precondition to arbitration and the investor’s failure to 
exhaust such remedies meant that the PCA tribunal’s jurisdiction was 
wanting in this regard as well. More broadly, this case demonstrates the 
Singapore courts’ supervisory role over arbitral tribunals which have 
their seat in Singapore.
(b) Exportation of Singapore Law
131 A  few preliminary points were made in the previous study to 
account for the upward trend in the citation of Singapore cases in foreign 
courts.261 It was said that the enactment of the AELA may partly explain 
the sharp increase in foreign citations of Singapore cases after 1996. It 
was suggested then that the AELA may have encouraged the growth of a 
local jurisprudence distinct from English law, which may have provided 
another point of view which foreign courts found to be of interest. If 
Singapore law had continued to be largely similar to English law, then 
foreign courts might simply cite English law rather than Singapore law.
132 If this is correct, then we must here try to explain the even further 
growth after 2010. Just as the AELA led to the growth of a distinctive 
Singapore law, so too did the concerted efforts to promote Singapore 
law in the 2010s lead to the spread of Singapore law. One example is the 
establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC) 
in 2015, following a planning period that had begun in 2013. The SICC, 
comprising international judges drawn from major common law and 
civilian jurisdictions, increase the exposure of foreign courts to Singapore 
decisions. While more studies would need to be done to verify the causal 
connection, it is plausible that such efforts to internationalise Singapore 
law may have contributed to the growing awareness of Singapore law and, 
with that, the increase in the citations of Singapore cases by foreign courts. 
In a similar vein, it might be said that it is encouraging that Singapore 
cases are now increasingly being cited in leading jurisdictions. This much 
is true for Australia and English courts which, as the data shows above, 
have started to cite more and more Singapore cases.
260 Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of Lesotho [2019] 1 SLR 263 
at [112].
261 Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan gen eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015) ch 16.
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V. Concluding thoughts
A. Andrew Phang’s views
133 As alluded to at the outset of the present article, I represent the 
older generation. It is difficult to believe that so much time has flown by. 
It seems like just yesterday when I was a fresh graduate eagerly (and even 
passionately) embarking on an academic career. It sounds like a cliché, 
but it is all so very true (and rings true to me even today). My only 
ambition then was to be as good a legal researcher and a law teacher as 
I could. It was a career in which I felt a real calling. It is an experiential 
matter which is difficult to capture in mere words, save to say that it not 
only felt right but also felt as if I had been born to do it (whether or not 
it benefitted the recipients of my efforts!). This was certainly the case for 
legal research. I was always interested in the law and loved writing about 
it (right from my first year as a student in law school). Teaching displayed 
less objective evidence. I never won a teaching award, but there is one 
thing I was always sure about – whether they realised it or not, I cared for 
my students not merely as receptacles to be filled with legal knowledge 
(although that is, I must concede, a not unimportant function of a law 
lecturer, second, of course, to making students think about the law) but 
also as people to engage with not just on law but also on life itself. The law 
is, in fact, a marvellous vehicle for discussing life and life values (without, 
of course, imposing one’s own views in a dogmatic fashion). I cannot say 
that I was successful in any substantial measure, but at least I tried and 
I did receive the occasional feedback, often years or decades down the 
road – either orally or in writing.262 It seems strange to cite anything from 
film. I am not a film buff and seldom go to the cinema. However, there is 
one memorable line from a film that was by no means an international 
hit but which seems to me to encapsulate the essence of the ideal teacher. 
The film is entitled “The Emperor’s Club”,263 and was based on a short 
story by Ethan Canin.264 Towards the end of the film, one of the students 
reads the following tribute from a plaque which he presents on behalf of 
the rest of his cohort to their former teacher:
262 In the form of cards and letters. One unusual form of written feedback is even in 
print (much to my surprise because it not only appeared in print but also actually 
referred to the concept of a receptacle): see Low Siew Ling, “Justices’ Law Clerk and 
State Counsel, Civil Division – Law in the Public Service” in The Practice of Law 
(Tang Hang Wu, Michael Hor & Koh Swee Yen gen eds) (LexisNexis, 2011) ch 16 at 
pp 148−149.
263 This was a 2002 film with Kevin Kline in the title role as a teacher at a fictional boys’ 
boarding school. The screenwriter was Neil Tolkin.
264 See Ethan Canin, The Palace Thief (Random House, 1994) at pp 153−205.
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A great teacher has little external history to record. His life goes over into other 
lives. These men[265] are pillars in the intimate structure of our schools. They are 
more essential than its stones or beams, and they will continue to be a kindling 
force and a revealing power in our lives.
134 There was one other ideal which I constantly attempted to 
realise  – that my legal writings would (in some small way) constitute 
a practical contribution to the profession. Therefore, when I left one 
university to join another two decades ago, I saved only a couple of law 
reports in which my work had been cited by Singapore courts (as there 
was insufficient justification to transport the rest to my new place of 
work). Little was I to know that I was later to join the Bench and assist 
directly in the development of Singapore law.
135 It therefore came as a bolt from the blue when I was asked to 
join the Bench. I had only appeared in court (as an amicus curiae) once. 
Indeed, after joining the Bench, I recall being in Hong Kong to deliver 
a public lecture. One of the first questions I was asked was what it was 
like to be a judge after having been a legal academic for such a long time 
(close to a quarter of a century in point of fact). I still recall my response 
vividly. It was unscripted and instinctive but quite picturesque. I likened 
the initial transition as follows: being a legal academic was like wearing 
a glove that was crafted by its maker who knew not only the size of my 
hand but also the material that fit so well that it felt like it was a part 
of me, whereas being a judge was like climbing up a wall with a near 
perpendicular gradient and with no safety harness! I am grateful that 
after a decade and a half on the Bench, the experience generates much 
less apprehension.
136 The point of this brief background is this: As a law student and 
then a legal academic, I have witnessed the development of Singapore 
law from a distance and can testify to the fact that, as this article has 
already alluded to, Singapore law was – for a very long time (and leaving 
aside specific statutory developments) – a mere carbon copy of English 
law. That was certainly my experience as a student and I often wondered 
whether there was any hope that the legal apron strings266 might ever 
be cut. This harks back to the time when I was a little bit of a starry-
eyed and idealistic lecturer yearning for something more. This led me 
to research and write a doctoral thesis on the development of Singapore 
law.267 As we have sought to demonstrate in the present article, there were 
in fact practical reasons that accounted for why English law continued to 
265 It should be noted that the teacher concerned in this film was male.
266 Cf R H Hickling, “Breaking Apron Strings” (1987) 8 Sing LR 78.
267 Ultimately published as The Development of Singapore Law (Butterworths, 1990). 
For an account of my experience in writing this thesis (in particular, the difficulties 
(cont’d on the next page)
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dominate the Singapore legal system even after independence and that 
it was only after the backlog of cases was cleared that the way became 
clear (or at least clearer) for developing Singapore law. Even then (as also 
explained above), developing the law is never an easy process. Unlike 
a legal academic who writes learned treatises and articles, the court can 
only deal with (and develop) an important point of law when it arises 
directly from the fact situation in the case before it. It can occasionally 
develop points of law by way of obiter dicta, but this is the exception 
rather than the rule for courts do not engage in self-indulgent conduct. 
And when an important or significant point of law does arise, the court 
cannot decide of its own accord; it must do so in accordance with the 
arguments of counsel in an adversarial system. To some extent, this 
can be remedied by the call for further submissions. However, unlike 
legal academics, courts are also constrained by the pleadings and 
facts; a roving commission or going off on a frolic of one’s own may be 
acceptable (or even be applauded) in legal academia but would constitute 
an abuse of process and/or breach of natural justice in a judicial setting. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, Singapore law has developed in many 
specific areas. The Singapore courts have been sensitive to both the 
cogency as well as logic of legal arguments and doctrines as well as to 
the needs and circumstances of the country as a whole. I would not have 
thought – in my lifetime at least – that Singapore courts would actually 
depart from House of Lords (now UK Supreme Court) decisions. But they 
have – and not out of any nationalistic or selfish reasons. As we noted at 
the outset of this article, the search is a search for principle. A promising 
and encouraging “by-product” of this is that Singapore cases have not 
only been cited in international and local textbooks as well as articles but 
have even been seriously engaged with in international journals by legal 
academics who are experts in their respective fields.268 However, as just 
mentioned, this is a mere “by-product”, albeit one that, despite being a 
very small jurisdiction, Singapore can be justly proud of.
137 Taking a step back, the bicentennial of Singapore also marks the 
coming of age for Singapore law. However, as also emphasised in this 
encountered), see Andrew Phang, “Which Road to the Past? – Some Reflections on 
Legal History” [2013] Sing JLS 1 at 18−22.
268 See, eg, (for an extremely small and somewhat random sampling, and only from the 
law of contract at that) Chitty on Contracts (Hugh G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 
33rd  Ed, 2018) at para  2-119, fn  594 and para  4-001, fn  5; Ewan McKendrick, 
Contract Law – Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 8th Ed, 2018) at 
pp 245−246 (where a substantial extract from a Singapore decision is to be found); 
Richard Hooley, “Implied Terms after Belize Telecom” (2014) 73(2)  Camb LJ 315 
(where the leading Singapore decisions on implied terms are critiqued); and (most 
recently) Ewan McKendrick, “Doctrine and Discretion in the Law of Contract 
Revisited” (2019) 1 Chinese J Comp Law 1 (where several Singapore decisions are 
discussed as well as contrasted with English law).
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article, the ones who reap the legal harvest must not forget the ones who 
laboriously ploughed the field and (with bent backs) planted the seeds 
and then watered and fertilised them.
138 However, what of the future? For me, there is not that much 
more time – relatively speaking – for active contributions on my part. 
The legal baton must be passed – and rightly so. On a personal level, 
I  am most encouraged for the future because it will be manned by 
persons more capable than I. That is not only consistent with the ideals 
of a teacher which I have referred to above,269 but is also consistent 
with ideals of succession generally. Vanity and ego are great stumbling 
blocks in life, whereas humility and sacrifice are utterly necessary for 
the growth not only of individuals but also of society itself. It will not 
be an easy road. I used, on occasion, to tell my students that my hope 
was that they would contribute much in positions of significance and 
authority in the future, but that my greatest worry was that they might 
get too caught up with their own selfish ambitions once they attained 
positions of authority. To overcome this obstacle is easier said than done: 
the vanity and ego I have just referred to are often insidious influences 
(and often self-rationalised). However, the paradox, in my view, is that 
by discarding selfish ambition, one can achieve true greatness by – to 
borrow from an earlier quotation270 – ensuring that one’s life goes into or 
flows into other lives, impacting them for the better. The modern phrase, 
I believe, is “paying it forward”. It is not easy but it will ensure that the 
development of Singapore law continues and continues well. As already 
mentioned, both my co-authors represent the future generations. They 
have the potential to achieve even better and greater results than their 
predecessors and are clearly equipped to do so. And it is this hope that 
encourages me that when it is time to actually pass the legal baton, it can 
be done with equanimity, confidence and real joy.
B. Goh Yihan’s views
139 The modern Singapore legal system has been a story 200 years 
in the making, since the British first landed on our shores in 1819. It is 
a story of how a system has grown from generation to generation, and 
now, in its latest incarnation, seeks to spread its influence abroad. When 
I was a law student some 15  years ago, I was struck by the increasing 
number of Singapore cases that tried to set out the applicable legal 
principles in Singapore, rather than simply following English law. The 
pragmatic reason for this was that, at a time when there were not so 
many local law textbooks, it was simply easier to read the actual case 
269 See para 133 above.
270 See para 133 above.
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that had summarised the applicable principles, rather than read a foreign 
textbook that analysed English cases. But the deeper reason was that, as 
a student of Singapore law (as I still am), I felt a sense of pride seeing our 
courts deciding our own laws, freed from the vestiges of foreign law. To 
be clear, this is not a call to be isolationistic, which would be a disaster 
in the context of an international hub like Singapore. However, as we 
internationalise, it is important that we are promulgating our own laws 
instead of merely applying laws from elsewhere without question, and 
then sharing that with the rest of the world, even as we learn from the 
best from all around the world.
140 After I graduated from law school, I had the chance to work in the 
legal service. From that perspective, I witnessed first-hand the creation 
of a uniquely Singaporean body of law. Thus, when I joined academia, 
I had an interest in studying the Singapore legal system. To that extent, 
with the generous support of the Singapore Academy of Law, a co-author 
(Paul Tan) and I embarked on the study of the Singapore legal system over 
Singapore’s first 50 years of independence. It was a humbling experience, 
as we gathered all the Singapore decisions from 1965 and tried to make 
sense of them all. We felt that there was a story to be told, and we wanted 
to tell the world about what the Singapore legal system is about. Unlike 
our co-author Jerrold Soh, who is very well-versed in using technology to 
study trends in the Singapore cases, we adopted a decidedly “stone age” 
approach of using Excel spreadsheets. I still remember trying to figure 
out how to fix the correlation between different data entries, and what 
variables to plot against each other. I also recall, with some fondness, the 
literally lengthy Excel spreadsheets that could not be sensibly printed.
141 It was then that my co-author and I decided to employ students. 
They were a revelation. They looked through each case carefully and 
plotted Excel spreadsheets that we simply did not have the expertise to 
do. But the telling of the story of our legal system still required every 
student to read through each and every case individually by eye. They did 
the hard work in telling the story of the Singapore legal system. As we 
shared with them at the end of the project, we hope that the experience 
was enriching not because they could say they had been research 
assistants in a project, but because they played such vital roles in telling 
the story of the Singapore legal system, from 1965 to (at the time) 2015. 
It was a real pleasure and privilege to work with each and every one of 
them. And, as I later discovered, Jerrold was from that batch of students. 
While I did not have the privilege of working with him then, I am proud 
to have him as my colleague now. This is the story of the Singapore legal 
system: stitched together bit by bit, generation by generation, each adding 
to the vast tapestry that we are proud to call our own. Jerrold’s generation 
represents that which will have the technical and doctrinal know-how to 
continue telling the story of the Singapore legal system.
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142 From my perspective, the story of the Singapore legal system as 
it has developed over 200 years is a story of growth, development and 
expansion. It grew out of the British legal system that was transplanted 
in Singapore as a result of colonisation. It then developed on its own 
terms, creating legal institutions and refining law to reflect the local 
circumstances. It is now at the phase of expansion, where its influence 
extends beyond Singapore to the rest of the world. And there is a great 
opportunity for all to work towards the creation of a legal system that 
we can all be proud of, and call our own. Presently, it also is rising to the 
challenges of globalisation, as it aims to reap the benefits of an increasing 
internationalising world. In the end, its next 200 years will undoubtedly 
see similar challenges ahead. But if the past 200 years are any indication, 
one can confidently think that the Singapore legal system will prosper 
into the next 200 years, with many more years to come.
C. Jerrold Soh’s views
143 I am new to the law. What I know of it comes not from first-hand 
experience but the wisdom of my predecessors, immortalised in prior 
work, and what the numbers presented above say. Since it is probably 
unwise for me to comment on the past, let me focus on the future. 
Anecdotally, few professional conversations today escape discussing 
it: the future of law, the future of work, the future of society itself. The 
economic, social, and therefore legal implications of climate change, big 
data, automation, aging populations, and other modern challenges will 
have to be addressed in the years to come.
144 I cannot claim to know how Singapore law and legal practice will 
adapt to this future, only that it will have to. By “it”, I mean nothing less 
than those of my and future generations who will have the privilege of 
running, managing, and perhaps governing the Singapore legal system. 
Yet this privilege, which continues to yield financial reward beyond the 
national median, comes inalienably bundled with the responsibility of 
ensuring the continuity of the first-rate legal system we inherit.271 Given 
today’s global climate, the task is non-trivial, to say the least.
271 My co-author is being modest in saying that previous generations have only planted 
the seeds of a strong legal system, watered and fertilised them. As this article has 
demonstrated, Singapore law today has a level of sophistication and international 
regard which indicates that it has certainly come of age. It is no young sapling but 
a veritable tree. Our present job is merely to pick its fruits. Much of this article’s 
empirical analysis was made possible by, and built on, the ground-breaking work 
conducted by Goh Yihan and his able student assistants (many of whom, I am happy 
to say, would call me a peer).
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145 As this article’s empirical analysis might have betrayed, I suspect 
that part of the answer entails multi- and inter-disciplinary collaboration. 
Lawyers should know the world and, equally importantly, the world 
should know the law. Indeed, more than a century ago Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr had already declared that “[f]or the rational study of the law 
the blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics”.272
146 I am lucky that this dated prophecy seems to be coming true only 
now.273 If I have the technological skills to study cases, it is only because 
I was formally trained in it. But my decision to study Economics and 
Computer Science was borne not of my own prescience, but due to wise 
counsel from three individuals whom I cannot thank enough. I refrain 
from naming them here so as not to be indulgent and perhaps not to 
embarrass them. Incredibly, barely six years ago, when I was entering law 
school, few saw the value of what was often labelled as “diluting my legal 
education” and “useless for practice”. But the first individual I must thank 
would often state in class, in no uncertain terms, that “everything you 
know will make you a better lawyer” (and this person knew a great deal); 
the second would consistently assure me that “your work is the future” 
and provide me ample opportunities to pursue my interests further; and 
the third, to whom I owe the most, would state rather simply, for he was 
far wiser than he was educated, that “if you can study more, just study 
more. That will help you make a difference.”
147 If so much can change over six short years, one hesitates to 
predict, even after reviewing 200 years of Singapore’s legal history, how 
the next ten, or even five, years would look like. But there is a way of 
predicting the future that is time-tested and arguably superior to the most 
sophisticated statistical forecasts, and it is perhaps fitting that I conclude 
this article by borrowing from software pioneer Alan Kay: “The best way 
to predict the future is to invent it.”274 What the future of Singapore law 
looks like is up to us.
272 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457.
273 The statement’s vintage is evident in its use of gendered terms.
274 Alan Kay is recorded to have said this at a conference in 1982, though this quote 
in its various forms has been attributed to different people over time. See Quote 
Investigator (2012), “We Cannot Predict the Future, but We Can Invent It”, available 
at https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/09/27/invent-the-future/ (accessed February 
2020).
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Appendix A – Data collection and validation methodology
148 We furnish details on the data collection methodology for two 
reasons. The first is to demonstrate the reliability of our data, subject 
to the caveats made explicit here. Second and equally importantly, we 
hope to provide a template data collection process that assists subsequent 
empirical work on Singapore law.
149 As a preliminary note, all of the information we needed for 
post-independence reported judgments were readily machine-extracted 
from the data structure of the HTML judgments we were authorised 
to download from LawNet. This is attributable to the prescient work of 
the Singapore Law Reports (“SLR”). Briefly and for the non-technical 
reader, the reporting team had appended machine-readable tags, such as 
“localCitation”, “catchwords”, and “coram”, to each these data points for 
every case. As a result, we could obtain all of the information automatically 
by essentially telling the computer to grab information associated with 
these tags.
150 The process for pre-independence cases was, however, more 
involved simply because these had not been covered by the SLR team. 
For these cases, we thus embarked on a human-led, machine-assisted, 
process which we now detail.
Process overview for pre-independence cases
Codebook design
151 The process begins with designing a data collection codebook, 
that is, a set of principles, rules, and policies for researchers manually 
coding data to follow. The first codebook created contained about 
15 pages, and comprised the following:275
(a) General data coding practices. These include, but are not 
limited to, whether to treat data inputs as case sensitive or not, 
the formats to express them in, the file formats (that is, .csv or 
.xlsx) to use. Here, an important principle established was to 
disambiguate between blank cells, known zeros, and unclear 
data cells. Typically, manual data collection proceeds as a series 
of blanks to be manually filled. Take the number of citations in 
a given case for example. Initially, the data value for the case is 
275 The codebook is available on file with the authors and can be made available on 
request.
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blank, simply because it is not known. Suppose the researcher 
then inspects the case and finds there to be no citations at all. 
A  good practice would be to positively fill a “0” into the data 
value. Should she leave it blank, a subsequent data user cannot 
identify whether the number of citations for that case is simply 
not known, or a known zero. Likewise, if the researcher thinks 
the number of citations is unclear, she should fill the blank with 
a flag such as “unclear”, instead of leaving it blank.
(b) Specific instructions by variable. The next section, 
sometimes called a data manifest, provides a field-by-field 
breakdown of the variables which the researchers are collecting 
for the study. This is immensely helpful not only for briefing the 
data annotators, but for ensuring consistency in the process. For 
our study, some machine-extracted variables were also provided 
to assist human annotators with the process. These machine-
extracted variables were also explained in the manifest. An 
excerpt of data manifest follows.
Field What you must do Special notes Example Cell 
Value
Citation The citation of the present 
case.
This field should be 
already quite accurate. You 
just need make sure it is 
not completely wrong, and 
fill it in if the data is blank.
Many cases have more 
than one citation. It 
suffices that the citation 
currently reflected is at 
least one of them. We 
need not capture all the 
citations.
[1950] MLJ 3
Jurisdiction Check this field first. This 
field should be already 
quite accurate. You just 
need make sure it is not 
completely wrong, and fill 
it in if the data is blank.
If the jurisdiction is not 
Singapore, it should 
be excluded from the 
study. Fill in the right 
jurisdiction and enter “1” 
in “remove_from_study”
Both lowercase and 
uppercase values are 
acceptable. Sing, SG and 
other abbreviations are 
also fine.
SINGAPORE
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Case date This field should be 
already quite accurate. You 
just need make sure it is 
not completely wrong, and 
fill it in if the data is blank.
This should be based on 
the “Decision Date” field 
of the judgment. If it is not 
there, do not make any 
assumptions
Use only the “DD/MM/
YYYY” format. Do not use 
dots, hyphens, etc. Do not 
type out month names 
like “Jan” or “January”. Use 
slashes only.
Excel will automatically 
interpret that as a date-
time. You do not need to 
enter a time, nor do you 
need to make sure Excel 
converts it.
11/16/1956
tagged_subjects You are to assign subject 
matter numbers to this 
case using a mix of 
information from the 
catchwords as well as the 
text of the case. When in 
doubt, ask me.
Each case may have more 
than one subject, but never 
none. If none fits, let me 
know.
You are to use the list 
format for entering data 
here.
S1 || S40
S1||S40 is also 
accepted
S40||S1 also. The 
order does not 
matter.
(c) Encodings of categorical variables. As alluded to by the 
data manifest, we also encoded certain variables into serial 
numbers such as S1, S2, etc. In particular, each of the 80 different 
top-level subject areas from the Singapore Academy of Law 
Subject Tree was assigned one serial number each, roughly based 
on the frequency we expected to see them arise. Civil procedure 
was assigned to S1, criminal procedure to S2, and so on, although 
these serial numbers were not designed to carry any critical 
information. This is helpful not only for reducing keystrokes 
(that is, annotators need not type the full item every time), but 
also, and more importantly, for ensuring data consistency.
(d) Strategies for dealing with imperfect/uncertain data. One 
of the unique challenges we faced with the Singapore law corpus 
was that, particularly for pre-independence cases, it was not always 
clear which court each case originated from. Many judgments 
would state “court unknown” or some equivalent. Others simply 
stated tangential information, like “original jurisdiction”. Further, 
Singapore’s court structure had gone through multiple changes 
before independence (much of which is discussed in the main 
body of this article). To overcome this, we devised a scheme for 
making informed guesses on a given case’s court level based on 
(a) decision date; (b) the number of judges; and (c) whether the 
court was exercising appellate or original jurisdiction. Where 
these variables triangulated, we could confidently assign a court 
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level. However, in cases of uncertainty, a flag would be raised for 
further inspection. A schematic diagram of this approach, also 
provided to annotators in our codebook, follows:
 
Figure 13: Flowchart for determining court levels. “Check” indicates 
that human verification is necessary.
Initial machine coding
152 As the diagram above suggests, the next step, codebook in 
hand, was not to commence human annotation immediately (as would 
be conventional), but to identify how far machine annotation could 
take us. For instance, having reduced the court classification task into a 
symbolic flowchart, we could implement it in code. The Python software 
we wrote output both the courts it was confident of identifying based on 
the triangulation above, as well as the “check” flags which helped human 
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annotators pay special attention to identifying the right court levels for 
these cases.
153 Python regular expressions were also used to attempt a “first cut” 
at extracting citations from judgment texts. This approach is explained in 
more detail in prior work,276 but roughly involves a more flexible means 
of searching through a text to find text patterns that look like citations. 
Broadly, the program tries to look for numbers in brackets, followed 
by certain numbers in close proximity. This first cut was provided to 
annotators as a reference when annotating. Importantly, it was impressed 
upon them that the software could make mistakes.
154 Subject matters for pre-independence cases were not machine-
extracted at all as it posed a higher-order challenge requiring human 
judgment. However, the software developed was able to extract 
catchwords from many of the cases to provide context for the annotators.
155 The remaining variables used in the study, such as jurisdiction 
and coram, were still largely machine-extractable. Although SLR-quality 
machine-readable tags were absent, some heuristics could be created 
from the LawNet-enforced structure of the judgment to pull out these 
data points. As this approach is concededly less reliable, the human 
annotators were also instructed to briefly double-check what the program 
extracted and to make corrections accordingly.
Human coding
156 The “first cut” data created by the program was then split into 
four chunks and assigned to four student assistants for manual completion 
and validation per the codebook. As we had about 1,500 cases to work 
on, each student received about 400 cases to look at. These chunks were 
overlapping by design, in that about 25 of each student’s cases were also 
assigned to another student who provided a second pair of eyes. This 
allowed us to detect and measure discrepancies in the tagging process 
(which is explained in more detail below).
157 The human coding process was itself split into phases to promote 
data accuracy and uniformity. Specifically, after an initial briefing, we 
asked the students to annotate only 25 cases each. We then reviewed these 
25 cases for errors and inconsistencies. A review session was conducted 
for us to debrief the students, and for them to make any clarifications 
(though it was made clear that they could approach us with clarifications 
276 Jerrold Soh, “A Network Analysis of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s Citations to 
Precedent” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 246 at 260–261, para 33.
  
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
at any time). The review sessions were instrumental in identifying 
situations where one student took a differing approach from another. 
These were resolved and a unified process committed it. The codebook 
was then updated to clarify any misconceptions the students had and 
provide further guidance on common mistakes made.
158 The students were then asked to annotate the next 100 cases, 
followed by another review. After the 100 cases were done, the students 
were asked to annotate the remainder. After the entire dataset was 
completed, a final review brief was conducted to clarify some doubts 
which arose during the process. Each student was then asked to review 
her/his own chunk before finalising it.
Discrepancies and inter-annotator agreement
159 We then put the four chunks back together again. Focusing 
first on the overlapping cases, we explored the level of inter-annotator 
agreement for variables of interest which we wanted to be most cautious 
with, namely, the number of cases citations per case, court levels, and case 
subject matters. Though some discrepancies arose, they do not appear to 
be systemic in a way that undermines the reliability of the rest of the 
dataset.
Court
160 The most common discrepancy which occurred was between 
variants of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements (“SCSS”).277 
Some cases were assigned to the SCSS’s High Court level even though 
they were actually Court of Appeal level cases, and vice versa. While 
these discrepancies do affect whether we can safely assign citations 
between the High Court and the Court of Appeal,278 they were relatively 
rare and, we submit, do not undermine the analysis. Across the around 
1,500 pre-independence cases in our dataset, 327 had been classified, 
after triangulation by the schematic above, as either “SCSS (CA)”, “SCSS 
(CCA)”, or “SCSS (HC)” cases. Ninety-four were flagged as potential 
SCSS cases for human validation. Within the 70 overlapping cases, fewer 
than ten mistakes arose.
277 To recall, under our coding scheme and pursuant to the 1873 and 1934 ordnances, 
the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements (“SCSS”) when exercising appellate 
jurisdiction should be referred to as the Court of Appeal and Court of Criminal 
Appeal respectively. SCSS (CA) and SCSS (CCA) are thus ancestors of today’s Court 
of Appeal. We also know that the post-1873 SCSS is an ancestor of the High Court. 
The pre-1873 SCSS is not practically relevant for our study as the earliest judgment 
in our dataset dates to 1877.
278 This point is explored at para 57 above.
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161 Another source of discrepancy was between Court of Appeals 
across time, particularly between the Court of Appeal and Court of 
Criminal Appeal. There were also two discrepancies between C9: SCSS 
(CCA) and C2: CCA. These discrepancies were resolved by checking 
the assigned court levels against the decision date. For example, a case 
decided before 1946 should not have been assigned to the C1: CA but to 
C8: SCSS (CA). Nonetheless, only 12 corrections had to be made here. 
Further, notice that any mistakes here would not affect our partitioning 
of cases into the Court of Appeal versus High Court levels.
Citations
162 Of the 70  overlapping cases, 43  cases had exactly the same 
citation counts, 15 differed by 1, 6 differed by 2, and 6 differed by 3 or 
more. We took this as indicating that the citation counts were generally 
safe to rely on, subject to two important caveats that could explain these 
discrepancies in citation counts.
163 First, the older reports present an interpretive puzzle for case 
citations. Case headnotes on LawNet, which sometimes provide a 
list of cases cited in the judgment, occasionally list cases not found in 
the judgment text which follows the headnotes; some judgment texts 
contain citations not listed in the headnotes. Likely, this is because 
of (a)  imperfections in the headnotes; and (b)  judgment texts being 
summarised by the reporter. Some human judgment was necessary to 
decide which citations to include or exclude.
164 Second, the older reports do not cite cases uniformly or 
completely. Some citations are malformed, such as with page numbers 
missing. Some cases were simply referred to by shortened name. Thus, 
two seemingly different citations could actually be referring to the same 
case. Annotators were told to make reasonable efforts, by searching 
on LawNet and Lexis, for complete citations. But this is an admittedly 
imperfect exercise. Where the annotator successfully finds the full 
citation, he or she may realise that the shorter citation resolves into 
another case already cited. This reduces the citation count by one. But if 
the annotator does not manage to find the full citation, he or she would 
have recorded the incomplete citation as a separate case. Errors caused 
by incomplete citations therefore tend to bias citation counts upwards for 
the pre-1965 cases. This could have affected foreign cases more than local 
cases.
Subject matter
165 Of the 70  overlapping cases, 35 had identical subject counts, 
24  differed by 1, 11 by 2, and none differed by 3 or more. Recall that 
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annotators were given a list of 80 categories of subject matter (based on 
the current SAL subject tree) to assign to the cases, as well as a category 
“Others” for any case not covered by the 80. To measure consistency 
in annotation, we calculated the percentage of agreement across the 
81  possible categories that annotators could use. Annotators are taken 
to “agree” on a category if either both assign the same subjects, or both 
do not assign the same category. The percentage agreement thus defined, 
averaged across the 70  duplicated cases, was 0.9848. We interpret this 
to mean that the subject counts were generally reliable, but could be 
improved.
166 For reference, if the annotators were randomly assigning 
cases to subjects (so each subject had a 50% chance of being assigned 
independent of all others), the long-run average agreement would be 
50%. If we had instead assumed that each subject had a 1/81 chance of 
being assigned, the long-run average across would be closer to 0.975.279 
Of course, neither 50% nor 1/81 are fair estimates of the prior probability 
that a subject is assigned to the case. The most common legal subjects 
like tort and contract are more likely to be assigned correctly and less 
likely to be missed out, since the student annotators would have a good 
grasp of these. Rare subjects like gambling law are also highly likely to be 
consistently not assigned.
167 Looked at in this light, we hypothesise that the bulk of the 
discrepancy occurs in subject areas that span across areas (like “words 
and phrases” and “damages”, as well as subjects the annotators may be 
less familiar with (such as “revenue law” and “courts and jurisdiction”)). 
We manually inspected the discrepancies in the 70 cases and noted that 
these topics were indeed sources of inter-annotator discrepancy. As our 
subsequent analysis relies primarily on the most common legal subjects, 
most of which are subjects that the student annotators would be familiar 
with (like tort and contract), these errors should not entirely undermine 
the analysis. These caveats, however, remain.
Post-assessment corrections
168 After looking at inter-annotator agreement, a final review 
was conducted. The student assistants were provided with a list of 
discrepancies and were asked to relook at the 70 overlapping cases in that 
light to identify if they had made any systemic mistakes in annotation. 
For each case, both students who had worked on that case were involved.
279 This number was be derived from simulating random Bernoulli draws for 
100 duplicated cases (making 200 cases total), ten times, and averaging the scores 
obtained.
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169 A positive side effect of this process was that all the discrepancies 
within the 70  cases could also be corrected, further improving data 
reliability. All four students reported that no systemic errors had been 
committed. Many of the discrepancies arose over minor points such as 
recording alternative citations of the same case. We then reviewed the full 
corrected dataset one final time before merging the data with the post-
independence cases.
170 The final dataset which we used to output the statistics and 
diagrams above thus comprises data on 1,441  pre-independence 
cases annotated by the process just described as well as 7,225  post-
independence cases for which data was automatically extracted. It bears 
emphasis that the data is not fool proof. Nonetheless, we submit that it is 
amply reliable for the analysis conducted in this article.
